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THE NATURE OF PREEMPTION
Stephen A. Gardbaumt
INTRODUCrION
It is "well established"' that Congress has the power to preempt
state law in a given area. The only issue in preemption cases is
whether Congress has in fact exercised this undoubted power.2 Such
exercise is a matter of the intent of Congress, and the issue is resolved
by an analysis of that intent.3 The apparent precision, orderliness,
and axiomatic quality of this black-letter position, however, conceals
fundamental confusion in the thinking of judges and scholars alike
about the underlying nature of preemption.
- Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. Oxford 1980;
M.Sc. London 1985; Ph.D. Columbia 1989; J.D. Yale 1990.
Although this Article analyzes the nature of preemption in the context of American
constitutional law, any insights it contains undoubtedly originated and were developed in
my capacities as a teacher of European Community (now European Union) law and a
student of comparative constitutional law. As I point out in the Introduction, the issues of
preemption and supremacy inevitably confront all federal systems, the European Union no
less than the United States. I would like to thank Robert Bennett, Steven Calabresi, Laura
Coyne, Charlotte Crane, David Engdahl, Candice Hoke, Gary Lawson, Michael Perry, Rich-
ard Pildes, and Martin Redish for valuable suggestions and comments. My greatest debts
are to Tom Merrill, whose interest in and understanding of preemption was of enormous
help to me in thinking through the issues raised in this Article, and to Joseph Weiler, who
taught me the importance of issues of federalism in the constitutional structure of the
European Union. Finally, I am grateful to the Julius Rosenthal Fund at Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law for support.
1 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
2 See, e.g., William Cohen, Congressional Power to Define State Power to Regulate Commerce:
Consent and Preemption, in COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVFS FROM THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE 523, 537 (Sandalow & Stein eds., 1982) ("Congress's power to preempt
state laws which affect interstate commerce is... unquestioned .... With reference to pre-
emption, the problem has been to define the standards for deciding when Congress has in
fact exercised that power." And, "[t]hus, the issue, in pre-emption cases, simply stated, is
not what Congress has the power to do, but what Congress has done.").
3 "The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone [of preemption analysis]...."
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). Under modem preemption doc-
trine, the Court has recognized three ways in which such intent may be manifested: (1)
express congressional intent to preempt state law; (2) implied intent where the congres-
sional legislation in question is so comprehensive as to completely occupy a given field and
thus leave no room for state regulation of the field ("field preemption"); and (3) implied
intent where federal and state law conflict ("conflict preemption"). Often, but not always,
a fourth category is recognized: implied intent where state law would unduly frustrate the
purposes of Congress ("frustration preemption"). See infra notes 206, 210. For the loci
classici of modem preemption doctrine, see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1947), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). See also infra notes 204-16 and accom-
panying text.
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Although as a topic, preemption has largely been ignored by con-
stitutional law scholars,4 it is almost certainly the most frequently used
doctrine of constitutional law in practice.5 This fact alone should en-
sure the importance of exposing and resolving the profound confu-
sion at the heart of preemption law, which is belied by the seemingly
simple statement of its provisions. But there is another reason for the
importance of this task. This is the centrality of the issue of the inter-
nal division of political power within the growing fields of comparative
constitutional law in general, and comparative federalism in particu-
lar. American constitutional scholars as a group may have happily be-
queathed the topic of preemption to others in quest of what they
perceive as more exciting fare, but this is not the case elsewhere. In-
deed, in many places, no such "luxury" is possible: the division of
powers between central and regional governments is an urgent polit-
ical and constitutional issue, the resolution of which may determine
whether the rule of law is possible. The granting of a power of pre-
emption to the central government is a common, but not a necessary,
feature of a federal state. Thus, preemption is a critical legal concept
that helps to define the nature of any federal political system, so that
an entity such as the European Union (prior to November 1, 1993,
the European Community6), for example, which is still developing its
sense of identity as a federal system, inevitably confronts the issue of
preemption just as the much more mature American system does. In
the case of the European Union, that confrontation has been much
more self conscious than it has in recent decades in the United States,
but that fact does not make a proper understanding of the nature of
preemption as a legal concept and its application within the particular
federal system any less critical for the one than for the other.
In the American context, the most common and consequential
error is the belief that Congress's power of preemption is closely and
essentially connected to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
7
4 I stress the term "constitutional law," as I wish to distinguish the paucity of "second-
order" scholarly work on preemption (reflection on the nature of preemption itself) from
the abundance of "first-order" work (the preemption of particular areas of state law by
specific federal statutes). Among the very few recent works which discuss preemption in
the second-order sense are DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTTrurIONAL FEDERALISM (1987); David
E. Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 51 (1973); S. Candice
Hoke, Preemptive Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 685 (1991); S. Can-
dice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24
Com. L. REV. 829 (1992) [hereinafter Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy].
5 A quick search on LEXIS revealed that the word "preemption" was mentioned in
49 Supreme Court cases in the last five terms alone.
6 That is, prior to the (belated) coming into effect of the European Union (Maas-
tricht) Treaty of 1992.
7 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
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Statements of preemption law almost routinely "start from the top"
with a reference to the Supremacy Clause,8 although the exact con-
nection that is claimed to exist between the two often varies. In fact,
in order of descending frequency and significance, three different
theories regarding the nature of the connection can be reconstructed
from the literature. First, Congress's constitutional power to preempt
state law derives from the Supremacy Clause.9 Second, regardless of
the source of the preemption power, the Supremacy Clause operates
to preempt state law where it conflicts with federal law.10 Third, each
case of preemption involves a conflict between Congress's intent to dis-
place state regulation in a given area, and the intent of the state or
states to regulate that same area. According to this view, the
Supremacy Clause operates to resolve this conflict in favor of
Congress."
This Article makes two claims. First, contrary to the standard
view, the power of preemption has little if anything to do with the
Supremacy. Clause. Second, correcting this central error about the
nature of preemption has significant implications for the content of
preemption law.
Part I argues that preemption and supremacy are quite distinct
legal and constitutional concepts. Supremacy does not presuppose
preemption, and each constitutes a different method of regulating
concurrent state and federal -powers. Part II demonstrates that each
of the three asserted connections is the result of muddled thinking
about preemption and supremacy, and establishes that the two have
little to do with each other. Part III turns from conceptual to histori-
cal analysis of the difference between supremacy and preemption. It
shows that unlike the principle of supremacy, which was firmly ac-
knowledged by the courts from the earliest period of constitutional
history, the unequivocal recognition of a congressional power of pre-
emption is of relatively recent vintage and forms an intrinsic part of
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
8 Here is a representative example, taken from the Supreme Court's 1991 term. "Ar-
ticle VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States 'shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the
Contrary notwithstanding.' Thus, since our decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been
settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect.' Consideration of issues
arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police pow-
ers of the States [are] not to be superseded by... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.'" Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617
(1992) (Stevens, J.) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
9 See infra note 22 for examples of this claim.
10 The exposition of preemption doctrine in virtually every modem preemption case
includes a statement to this effect. See, e.g., Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 ("[S]tate law is pre-
empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law") (citations omitted).
11 -See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text; See also infra part II.C.
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the great expansion of national powers that has taken place during
the course of this century.
Part IV discusses the implications of the previous analysis. Be-
cause of the assumed connection with the Supremacy Clause, preemp-
tion takes on the false appearance of a distinct area of constitutional
law. Indeed, the Supreme Court sometimes refers to preemption
claims as "Supremacy Clause cases." 12 In reality, the Supremacy
Clause adds nothing to what should be a question of interpreting what
Congress has in fact done. Preemption claims should be resolved
through application of ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, and
not through doctrinal categories such as "conflict preemption" and
"field preemption," both of which constitute distorting filters through
which the determination of congressional intent is mistakenly re-




Contrary to the prevailing view, which treats them as either essen-
tially identical or necessarily connected, supremacy and preemption
are quite distinct legal concepts and constitute two alternative meth-
ods of regulating the relationship between concurrent federal and
state powers. It should at the outset be clear that both the issues of
supremacy and preemption arise only where the states and the federal
government have concurrent power. Where Congress has exclusive
power, no issue of preemption can arise because there is no state legis-
lative power to be preempted. Similarly, in such areas, the Supremacy
Clause is redundant as there can in principle be no conflict between
valid state and federal laws where the states have no power to act, and
vice-versa.
The supremacy of federal law means that valid federal law over-
rides otherwise valid state law in cases of conflict between the two. In
itself, federal supremacy does not deprive states of their preexisting,
concurrent lawmaking powers in a given area; rather, it means that a
particular state law in conflict with a particular federal law will be
trumped in cases where both apply. State legislation has full effect as
long as it is not in conflict with federal law, and state legislative com-
petence in a given area fully survives the trumping of any particular
state law on supremacy grounds. This means, for example, that in the
face of a potential or actual conflict with federal law, states retain legis-
lative power to amend their legislation in order to avoid the conflict.
12 See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651 (1971). See also Hoke, Transcending
Conventional Supremacy, supra note 4, at footnote 4.
770 [Vol. 79:767
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It also means that where no federal law covers specific subjects within
a given field of congressional regulation, states remain free to regulate
those subjects without regard to the federal scheme.
Preemption, by contrast, means (a) that states are deprived of
their power to act at all in a given area, and (b) that this is so whether or
not state law is in conflict with federal law.13 When states lose their
concurrent lawmaking powers through preemption by Congress, the
issue of potential substantive conflict between the content of valid
state and federal laws is simply not reached, for the state no longer has
power to legislate at all in the given area. Preemption is thus ajuris-
diction-stripping (or 'jurispathic"'14) concept, unlike supremacy which
deals with conflict resolution in particular cases. To borrow two terms
from conflict of laws scholarship, supremacy resolves a "true con-
flict"-a conflict between two valid laws on the same issue; by contrast,
preemption resolves a "false conflict" 5-where it applies, there is only
one valid law governing the issue, namely the federal. Whereas
supremacy resolves a conflict resulting from the exercise by two or
more entities of their concurrent powers, preemption implies that
one entity (the federal) has attained exclusive power on the issue. Ac-
cordingly, on any given subject, there are potentially two separate
questions to be answered. First, is state lawmaking power preempted
by Congress? If so, then federal law governs and that is the end of the
inquiry. If not, and thus the states retain concurrent lawmaking
power to act in the field, one must then consider whether the particu-
lar state law in question conflicts with the terms of the relevant federal
law. If it does, then that state law (but not others) is trumped by appli-
cation of the Supremacy Clause.
Thus, preemption is a significantly more radical inroad on state
power than supremacy per se. Supremacy means that states remain
free to act as long as their laws are not in conflict with federal law;
preemption means that states lose their power to act at all, regardless
of any conflict with federal law. Each principle constitutes a different
regime for regulating concurrency: in the case of supremacy, continu-
ing co-equal powers with a rule for resolving conflicts; in the case of
preemption, terminating the co-equal powers of the states.
At this point, even if the validity of the distinction I have drawn
between the legal concepts of supremacy and preemption is con-
ceded, it might still be thought that the practical difference between
13 For a recent statement of the difference between supremacy and preemption in the
context of the federal structure of the European Union, see Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Trans-
formation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403, 2417 (1991).
14 See Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. Rav. 4 (1983).
15 See, e.g., JAMEs MAMRTN, CoNFLicr OF LAiWS 226 (2d ed. 1984).
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them could, in principle, be reduced to nil: supremacy can be made
to cover the same legal ground as preemption.
Such an argument might take the following form. Conflicts are
matters of degree, with the spectrum ranging from direct contradic-
tion (that is, it is impossible to comply with both) to minor differences
between state and federal laws on the same subject, where the state
law does not interfere with the objectives of the federal law. As a hy-
pothetical example of the latter,' 6 imagine a federal statute requiring
that a health warning cover a minimum of four percent of the surface
area of a cigarette package, and a law of State Y requiring that the
same warning cover five percent of the surface area. Absent the
power of preemption, the scope of supremacy principles could be ex-
panded from the traditionally strict view incorporating a presumption
of no conflict, to include any degree of conflict, even the most minor
difference between state and federal law.1
7
There are two problems with this argument. First, even though
the exact type or degree of difference that is necessary to constitute a
"conflict" between state and federal laws probably cannot be specified
a priori, there are undoubtedly conceptual (and constitutional) limits
which render the suggested spectrum far too wide. Mere differences
are certainly insufficient.' 8 Second, quite apart from this issue of the
particular degree of conflict required to trigger a valid supremacy
claim, there are general structural differences between the two con-
cepts which stem from the fact that what distinguishes supremacy
16 In fact, this example is hypothetical only from the perspective of U.S. law. It was
taken from the European Union's recent Cigarette Labeling Directive and the United
Kingdom statute passed to implement ("transpose") that directive.
17 Indeed, according to Professor Hoke, this describes the tendency of the federal
courts over the past fifty years or so. See Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy, supra
note 4.
In doctrinal terms at least (if not always in practice), courts apply a presumption in
favor of state law in both preemption and supremacy contexts. (It might be argued that
these presumptions constitute the last vestiges of federalism in the American system. See
infra part IV.) Currently, again at least doctrinally, the presumption against conflict trans-
lates into the proposition that a relatively high degree of conflict is required for a state law
to be trumped. Another way of stating that courts should expand the scope of supremacy
principles to cover more minor interferences or differences is to say that they could adopt
a presumption of conflict.
18 See Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy, supra note 4 (arguing that the
Supremacy Clause, which does not in its terms specify the degree of conflict necessary for
its application, should, for reasons of federalism and republican democracy, only be in-
voked in cases of conflict nearer the direct contradiction end of the spectrum).
Professor Hoke makes this point in the context of her general thesis that "all types of
preemption claims should be reconceptualized as species of conflict," and that state law
may only be preempted when in proscribed conflict with federal law. See Hoke, id. at notes
287-88 and accompanying text; See also Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican
Values, supra note 4, at 735-37. The arguments in this section and in parts ILA. and II.C.
constitute my response to this thesis.
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from preemption is the centrality of conflict in the former and its ir-
relevance in the latter.
Under any version of the principle of supremacy, a finding of
conflict applies only to the specific state measure at issue, whereas pre-
emption applies to every measure in the given field. In other words,
supremacy necessitates case-by-case analysis on an ex post basis. State
regulation of the field cannot be ruled out ex ante. Moreover, no
plausible version of the principle of supremacy can prevent states
from amending their measures to avoid the conflict, a power that
gives the states a significant measure of control; conversely, under a
regime of preemption, Congress maintains the initiative.
This loss of congressional control to the states under the
Supremacy Clause, however, is probably less important than Con-
gress's loss of control to the courts. Unlike preemption, which is a
matter of legislative will, supremacy is inherently a judicial matter: it
is up to the courts to determine, in the context of a case or contro-
versy, if there is a conflict between the two laws at issue.19 Whether or
not to preempt state law, on the other hand, is a matter within the
discretion of Congress. The court's role is limited to discovering Con-
gress's intent,20 and (in principle) Congress has the ability to make its
intent crystal clear.21 Accordingly, even with the most extreme manip-
ulation, supremacy cannot cover the same legal ground as
preemption.
II
THE ERRONEOUS CoNNECTIoNs BETWEEN PREEMPTION AND
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
A. The Source of Congress's Power of Preemption
1. The Supremacy Clause
It is widely assumed that Congress's power of preemption derives
from the Supremacy Clause. Being assumed, the derivation is often
left implicit, but even where stated, it tends to be asserted perempto-
rily and without explanation in judicial opinions and scholarly articles
19 A state or federal court must first decide on the interpretation of the state law in
question. A state or federal court must then decide if the state law, as interpreted, conflicts
with the federal.
20 See supra note 3.
21 I acknowledge that the distinction I am drawing between the role of a court under
preemption and supremacy analyses (interpreting clearly expressed intent versus adjudi-
cating a conflict) is somewhat formalistic in a (judicial) world in which there are no facts,
only interpretations. Nonetheless, there is still a difference (at least of degree) between a
situation in which what is being interpreted is congressional intent itself (preemption),
and one in which, even though Congress may have expressed its view, it is not that view
which is being adjudicated, but the existence of a conflict (supremacy).
1994]
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alike. 22 There are, however, at least two straightforward problems
with this view of the constitutional source of the preemption power.
First, it fails to explain how the Supremacy Clause, which on its face is
the Constitution's dispute resolution mechanism, can be understood
to grant any powers at all. The Supremacy Clause does not empower,
but rather resolves a particular problem arising out of the powers
granted by other parts of the Constitution: namely, conflicts resulting
from concurrent state and federal powers.
Second, this assumed derivation fails to appreciate that, as ex-
plained above, supremacy and preemption are distinct legal concepts
constituting two different methods of regulating the relationship be-
tween concurrent federal and state powers.2 3 For once the distinction
is acknowledged, the following problem immediately arises: while the
Supremacy Clause expressly contains the supremacy principle, it says
nothing about preemption.
Faced with these two threshold problems, simple assertion of the
derivation no longer suffices. Proponents of this view must explain
how preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause, how the clause
contains not only the principle of supremacy but also that of preemp-
tion. Having (I hope) succeeded in undermining the common as-
sumption that preemption automatically derives from supremacy, I
now turn to the task of establishing the following stronger thesis: pre-
emption cannot derive from supremacy.
The basic argument for. this stronger thesis follows directly from
the analytical distinction between supremacy and preemption, and
can be simply stated in syllogistic form. A greater power cannot (logi-
cally) derive from a lesser one. Preemption is a greater federal power
than supremacy (that is, the ability of congressional legislation to pre-
22 See, e.g., New York Central R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 148 (1917) ("it [] is
settled that when Congress acts upon the subject all state laws covering the same field are
necessarily superseded by reason of the supremacy of the national authority") (emphasis added).
See also Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2388 (1992)
("But under the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, 'any state law
... which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.'") (emphasis added);
ENGDAHL, CONSTrTUTIoNAL FEDERALISM, supra note 4, at 76 ("By virtue of the supremacy clause,
every federal law 'made in Pursuance' of the Constitution, has the capacity to supersede, or
preempt, state law.") (emphasis added); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrTIONAL LAw 219 (12th
ed. 1991) ("When Congress exercises a granted power, the federal law may supersede state
laws and preempt state authority, because of the operation of the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI. In
these cases, it is ultimately Art. VI, not the commerce clause or some other grant of dele-
gated power, that overrides the state law.") (emphasis added); Cohen, supra note 2, at 537
("Unlike the power of Congress to consent to state laws, the power of Congress to pre-empt
state laws has not been subject to puzzling questions of the source of Congressional power.
Acting within the scope of its delegated powers, Congress may require or permit conduct
that state law requires or prohibits, or prohibit conduct that state law requires or permits.
That is the clear meaning of the Supremacy Clause.... .") (emphasis added).
23 See supra part I.
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empt state lawmaking power constitutes a greater inroad on state
power than the principle that federal law trumps state law when the
two conflict). Therefore, preemption cannot (logically) derive from
supremacy.
Those who are persuaded by the weaker thesis-that there is
nothing automatic about deriving preemption from the Supremacy
Clause-may believe that the affirmative case for the derivation that I
have admittedly shown to be necessary is nonetheless readily available,
thus undermining the stronger thesis at the outset. This affirmative
case for the derivation is that all preemption cases can be translated
into conflict cases, so that whatever the conceptual differences be-
tween the two, the practical difference between supremacy and pre-
emption ultimately collapses. In this way, preemption becomes simply
a different way of characterizing supremacy, leading to the conclusion
that the power of preemption can be derived from supremacy or con-
flict principles after all.
The argument for the claim of translatability takes the following
form. First, under the Court's current preemption doctrine, what it
terms "conflict preemption" or "actual conflict" is simply the classic
case for the application of supremacy principles. In this situation,
there is an actual conflict between the substantive terms of certain
federal and state laws. For example, a federal statute states that a
specified warning of the dangers of cigarette smoking which must be
placed on cigarette packages by the manufacturer is both necessary
and sufficient to fulfil the duty to warn, thereby shielding the manu-
facturer from civil liability for the harmful consequences of cigarette
smoking.24 The law of State X, on the other hand, asserts that such a
warning is not sufficient to protect the manufacturer. I shall call such
situations "first-order conflicts."
Second, the other two major types of modem preemption cases,
those of "express preemption" (in which Congress has expressly stated
its intent to preempt state law on a particular subject) and "field pre-
emption" (where such intent is implied-or rather inferred-from
Congress's attempt to "occupy the field" with a comprehensive
scheme of legislation that leaves no room for state jurisdiction) can
both be recharacterized as conflict cases. In these situations, there is a
conflict, although not between the substantive terms of federal and
state legislation. Rather, the conflict exists between Congress's (ex-
press or implied) intent that there should be no state regulation in a
given area, on the one hand, and the actions of a state seeking to
24 This statute, The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. 1331-
1341 (1988), was at issue in the well-known Cipolone litigation. Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208 (1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in par4 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), af/'d in
part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
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regulate any part of that area-regardless of the actual content of the
regulation-on the other. I shall call such situations "second-order
conflicts." Thus, by recharacterizing express and field preemption
cases into such second-order (or 'jurisdictional") conflicts between
federal and state laws, it would seem possible to rely directly on
supremacy principles, which of course require that Congress prevail.
In this way, preemption is seen to be a species of conflict after all
(rather than conflict a species of preemption) and thus, it is squarely
derivable from the Supremacy Clause.
Interestingly, this recharacterization or translation of preemption
cases into conflicts was recently suggested by Justices Souter and
O'Connor.25 In Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n,26 Jus-
tice O'Connor quotes approvingly fromJustice Souter's dissent in Eng-
lish v. General Electric Co,27 as follows: "[F]ield preemption may be
understood as a species of conflict preemption: A state law that falls
within a preempted field conflicts with Congress's intent (either ex-
press or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation."28
Plausible though this translation of "express" and "field" preemp-
tion situations into second-order conflicts may appear at first glance
(and thus devastating for the strong thesis), it does not survive closer
scrutiny. The reason is that the translation begs the question it poses,
which is precisely whether Congress has the constitutional power to say
(expressly or impliedly) "there shall be no state regulation of field X"
in the first place-that is, whether Congress has the power to preempt
state law. The argument assumes the very power of preemption that it
claims to be deriving from the Supremacy Clause. Supremacy princi-
ples apply where there is a conflict between two valid laws-one state
and the other federal. In order for the congressional law forbidding
state regulation of field X to be valid, there must already be a power to
preempt state law. This power is the cause of the conflict and not the
effect. That is, if Congress does have the power to say "no state regula-
tion," this power must preexist the conflict and cannot derive from it.
If, on the other hand, Congress does not already have the preemption
power, then legislation containing such a "no state regulation" provi-
sion would be unconstitutional. In this case, because there are not
two valid laws in conflict, the Supremacy Clause would not apply (the
25 See Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386. This recharacterization, however, was not suggested in
response to the claim that only conflicts are governed by the Supremacy Clause, but rather,
as a way of importing flexibility and open-endedness into the three categories of preemp-
tion (express, field, and conflict), which are usually viewed as mutually exclusive.
As noted above, Professor Hoke has also suggested that all preemption cases should be
reconceptualized as species of conflict. See supra note 18.
26 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
27 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
28 Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386 n.2.
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state law would stand) and, obviously, the power of preemption can-
not be derived from it. Either way, the Supremacy Clause is irrelevant
with regard to the validity or invalidity of the federal law, and the at-
tempt to derive the power of preemption from second order conflicts
fails.
Another way of stating this argument is as follows: if Congress has
the power of preemption, an exercise of this power would be effective
regardless of whether or not any state had already attempted to regu-
late the same field. That is, the states would be preempted even when
no second-order conflict exists. If this is so, the power of preemption
cannot depend upon the existence of such a conflict and, therefore, it
cannot derive from the Supremacy Clause.
In sum, even assuming that all cases of preemption can be
manipulated to involve a conflict between federal and state law, it
does not follow that preemption can be derived from the Supremacy
Clause. Second-order, or jurisdictional, conflicts can only come into
existence once the relevant federal law preventing states from regulat-
ing a given area is deemed valid; that is, when the power of preemp-
tion has already been established.
2. The Commerce Clause
The preceding sections establish that the power of preemption
does not derive from the Supremacy Clause. In addition, they demon-
strate that this power is not redundant: by itself, the principle of
supremacy cannot cover the same legal ground as preemption. Ac-
cordingly, if the preemption power is constitutionally justified, its
source lies elsewhere.
Even those who believe that preemption derives from the
Supremacy Clause would probably agree that Congress has most often
exercised this power in the context of acting under its general author-
ity to regulate interstate commerce. That is, the Commerce Clause
represents the characteristic vehicle for the exercise of the preemp-
tion power. The proposition that will now be considered is whether
the power itself can be located in this clause: that is, does the Com-
merce Clause constitute both the vehicle for and the source of
preemption?
The argument for the Commerce Clause derivation of the power
of preemption might take the following form. If Congress has the
power to do X (for example, to regulate the tobacco industry) under
its general authority to regulate interstate commerce, then that power
includes the power to preempt state lawmaking capacity. No addi-
tional question of congressional authority is raised when the exercise
of this power involves the preemption of preexisting state legislative
competence. It makes no sense to ask by what constitutional grant of
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power Congress is enabled to preempt state regulatory power in the
course of exercising its own undoubted powers of regulation in a
given area. To ask this question is to be guilty of a "category mis-
take"2 9 on a par with the one that confuses supremacy with preemp-
tion. This is because preemption is an instance of federal regulation of
interstate commerce and is not the exercise of a separately granted
power.
At first sight, this is a powerful argument. Such an appeal to the
parsimony of Occam's razor is always attractive where appropriate;
but, on closer inspection, it is not appropriate here. In effect, the
argument does not seek to solve the problem of the source of the
preemption power, but to dissolve it: preemption does not raise the
issue of justifying a separate Congressional power because it is simply
one way in which Congress may exercise the single power of regulat-
ing interstate commerce. In reality, however, the argument does not
dissolve the problem but merely recharacterizes it. Given both the
constitutionally granted concurrent powers of the states and the exis-
tence of the Supremacy Clause, the following question still needs to
be answered: why is preemption a constitutionally justified form of
regulation? The fact that preemption may be characterized as a form
of regulation does not mean that it is a constitutionally authorized
form. However the problem is framed, it is still one thing to expand
the scope of the federal commerce power (what areas can be regu-
lated) and another to say that within this scope, Congress can abolish
concurrent state power (what form may regulation constitutionally
take). In other words, the argument necessarily involves implying the
preemption power as part of the general commerce power. And if
this is so, the necessity of providing a constitutional justification for
the implication cannot be avoided by defining preemption as part of
what it means to possess the power to regulate interstate commerce.
Once the merits of this implication are reached, however, a
number of serious constitutional objections present themselves. First,
there is a straightforward textual problem, analogous to the one in-
volving the purported derivation of preemption from supremacy. In
principle, there are at least two possible means of regulating concur-
ring state and federal commerce powers, however extensive the latter
may be: the principle of supremacy alone, and supremacy plus pre-
emption. As between these two, only supremacy has obvious textual
support. What basis is there for implying preemption where the textu-
ally-based method of regulation is entirely coherent, if not necessarily
*the most convenient? Just as the Supremacy Clause does not refer
29 See GILBERT RLB, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1948).
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to-and is perfectly coherent without implying-the power of pre-
emption, the same is true of the Commerce Clause.
Second, and more importantly, an obvious implication of deriv-
ing the preemption power from the Commerce Clause is that, con-
trary to the conventional understanding,30 there would be no general
congressional power of preemption. The power would exist only
where Congress acts under the Commerce Clause and not where it
acts under any of its other concurrent enumerated powers. Deriva-
tion from the Commerce Clause would thus constitute a limitation on
the power as it is generally understood. Although this limitation may
not appear to have much practical significance-because Congress al-
ready acts under the commerce power in most preemption situations
or could so act given the clause's broad modem interpretation-
nonetheless, the Court has certainly recognized preemption under
legislation adopted pursuant to other enumerated powers. Indeed,
some of the most important preemption cases have assumed that the
power is not limited to Commerce Clause legislation.
31
Third, another complication results from treating the Commerce
Clause as the source of the power of preemption. What theory of con-
stitutional interpretation, it might be asked, justifies inferring the
power of preemption from the mere grant of power over interstate
commerce without inferring it also from other mere grants of con-
gressional powers? What is different about the grant of federal power
under the Commerce Clause that alone includes a power of preemp-
tion? At least from a textualist point of view, it would seem that as a
matter of basic constitutional interpretation, the identical textual
grant of "mere" power must have the same implications for federal/
state relations in all cases.32
30 See, e.g., PATRICK ATirAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERiCAN LAw 58 (1987). See also ENGDAHL, supra note 22 (". . . every federal law 'made in
pursuance' of the Constitution, has the capacity to supersede or preempt state law"); GUN-
TIER, supra note 22 ("when Congress exercises a granted power, the federal law may
supercede state laws and preempt the state . . . all because of the operation of the
Supremacy Clause." (emphasis added).
31 For example, the federal statute at issue in Hines, one of the landmark cases estab-
lishing modem preemption doctrine, was based not on the interstate commerce power,
but on Congress's power over matters of naturalization and immigration. 312 U.S. at 66.
Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the federal statute at issue in the leading case of
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), was not based on the
Commerce Clause.
The Court has also recognized preemption under legislation pursuant to the Property
Clause of Article IV. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). It has also done
so with respect to the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, although here, the situation is differ-
ent because Congress is expressly granted the power to pass uniform laws in the area, i.e.,
to preempt the states. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
32 For a recent example of such a textualist argument (albeit made in the context of
different clauses of the Constitution), that similar clauses in different parts of the Constitu-
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One response to this textualist point might be that the Com-
merce Clause contains the only instance of concurrent federal and
state powers in the Constitution.33 It might be argued, for example,
that all original congressional powers were exclusive,3 4 with the com-
merce power alone becoming concurrent over time as a result of its
expansion into areas traditionally reserved exclusively to the States. If
this is the case, preemption would be both a general federal power
and a power specific to the Commerce Clause. Even if the burden of
establishing this claim were successfully discharged, however, the ar-
gument for the Commerce Clause derivation would still remain in-
complete. For it would only establish that a concurrent commerce
power requires an implied power of preemption to make it operable,
allowing uniform national laws to be guaranteed where necessary. It
would not establish how, as a matter of constitutional theory and in-
terpretation, one moves from practical necessity to constitutional
justification.
A second response, one that does point towards justification,
might explain directly what is different about the Commerce Clause
such that a power of preemption is implied here that is not implied in
any other concurrent federal powers that may exist. This response
focuses on the inherent primacy of the federal government's responsi-
bility for regulating interstate commerce and protecting the national
market, a responsibility that goes beyond co-equal powers with the
states. Certainly, an argument for this position can be made on the
basis of "modified" original intent. That is, although an originalist
version of this "inherent primacy" argument would point towards sim-
ple rather than latent exclusivity of the federal commerce power,3 5
the modern expansion of this power renders straightforward exclusiv-
ity utterly unworkable. The sheer amount of regulation and the com-
plexity of the issues involved would place far too heavy a burden on
tion should be given the same meaning, see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153 (1992).
33 The Eighteenth Amendment explicitly provided a second instance. "The Congress
and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII, § 2 (repealed 1933). In fact, this is the only express
reference to concurrent powers in the entire text of the Constitution.
34 The argument might take the following form. First, most of the powers granted to
Congress are inherently national powers, requiring central authority. Second, exclusive
grants of power to Congress explain the meaning of the Tenth Amendment's reservation
to the States of all powers not delegated to the United States; in other words, those dele-
gated are not reserved to the states. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X. Third, by the time the Eight-
eenth Amendment was adopted in 1919, there was a presumption that where Congress is
given explicit power, that power is exclusive. Only this would explain the need for an
express reference to concurrent powers in the Amendment. See U.S. CONsr. amend. XVII,
§ 2 (repealed 1933).
35 See Justice Johnson's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
See also infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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Congress under an exclusive system without overlap, and requires at
least some residual state regulatory powers. Although it will not satisfy
the textualist, this combination of special federal responsibility and
the practical need for state participation might perhaps provide a fea-
sible justification for the unique jurisdictional principle of preemp-
tion in the context of the commerce power over and above the
normal regime of concurrency plus supremacy.
Fortunately, it is unnecessary to grapple further with these argu-
ments for and against the Commerce Clause derivation because there
is an easier and more plausible solution available to the problem of
source, a solution moreover that is consistent with textualist princi-
ples. This is that the gap between practical necessity and constitu-
tional justification is bridged in the text of the Constitution itself:
namely, the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article 1.36
3. The Necessary and Proper Clause
Undoubtedly, the basic and most compelling argument in favor
of a congressional power of preemption is a practical one-the need
for uniform national regulation, for one set of rules, in particular ar-
eas. As Part III will demonstrate, the tremendous contemporary
growth in both the amount and scope of federal regulation, and the
increasingly obvious need for a single scheme of regulation in areas
such as interstate railroads, explain the urgency surrounding recogni-
tion of the power of preemption at the beginning of the twentieth
century. To see the issue of preemption in terms of this need, how-
ever, is to point to a more satisfactory constitutional justification of it.
Simply put, in certain areas and under certain circumstances,
Congress needs to pass uniform national laws in order to exercise its
express powers effectively. Most often, but not necessarily, this need
arises under its power to regulate interstate commerce. Supremacy
principles are sometimes insufficient. Yet, these are precisely the cir-
cumstances under which Congress is authorized to use the powver con-
tained in the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause located at
the end of Section 8, Article I. From McCulloch v. Maryland37 on, the
Necessary and Proper Clause has been understood to authorize ac-
tions which, in themselves, are not within Congress's express Article 1
powers, but serve to effectuate other policies within the express pow-
ers. In Marshall's words, "[1] et the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
36 "The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, section 8, cl. 18.
37 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
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which are plainly adapted to that end.., are constitutional."38 From
the creation of the Bank of the United States to the outlawing of pri-
vate acts of racial discrimination,3 9 measures that are not within the
express powers of Congress have been authorized under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause as appropriate methods of regulating inter-
state commerce. In precisely the same manner, the Necessary and
Proper Clause provides the power to preempt state law in order to
pass uniform national laws. The existence of a layer of state regula-
tion, although not in conflict with the federal, is sometimes
inappropriate.
There is thus a straightforward plausibility behind ultimately de-
riving preemption from Congress's enumerated power under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause.40 Moreover, doing so overcomes the
potential problems associated with the Commerce Clause derivation.
First, there is no textual problem: the power of preemption ultimately
stems from a clear textual grant of power to Congress. Second, under
this derivation, Congress has the potential for a general power of pre-
emption: the power to pass uniform national laws is, in principle,
available under all other enumerated powers rather than being re-
stricted to the Commerce Clause. As noted above, this is consistent
with the conventional understanding of the scope of the power. 41
Moreover, the fact that the source of the preemption power lies
outside the Commerce Clause does not, of course, prevent the full
exercise of the power through the vehicle of that clause. Indeed, the
conventional wisdom locates the source outside the Commerce
Clause, namely, in the Supremacy Clause.
In sum, the power of preemption derives from the Necessary and
Proper Clause; it is authorized as a means of effectuating other con-
gressional powers. It has nothing to do with the Supremacy Clause.
The independent principle of supremacy alone is insufficient to guar-
antee the uniform national regulation that is sometimes required.
38 Id. at 421.
39 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). As the concurrences in both of these cases note, symboli-
cally at least, the commerce power was a strange basis on which to rely, given the seeming
availability of express legislative authorization under Section V of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring).
40 As Engdahl makes clear, the power granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause is
enumerated not implied. "The phrase 'implied powers,' commonly associated with the
clause from the beginning is an unfortunate and confusing misnomer .... [U]nique
among the enumerated powers, this one concerns no particular subject matter but oper-
ates instead in conjunction with each of the other power-granting clauses." Engdahl, supra
note 22, at 17. For a recent work arguing that the scope of the power granted by the clause
is limited by the word "proper," see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause 43 DuKE LJ. 267 (1993).
41 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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As will be described in Part III, recognition of the preemption
power was an intrinsic part of the expansion of federal power that has
taken place over- the course of this century. This explains why the
power of preemption was not generally recognized for most of the
previous century.42 It is not that the Supremacy Clause has changed
or expanded, or that it now yields implications that were previously
overlooked; rather, it is the nature and extent of congressional power
that has changed. In effect, a transformation occurred, replacing the
previous regime of concurrent powers regulated only by the principle
of supremacy ("concurrency plus supremacy") with the modem re-
gime of concurrent powers regulated also by a congressional power of
preemption ("concurrency plus preemption"). But this transforma-
tion did not begin and end with the New Deal revolution in federal
power. The first installment of the enlarged federal power encom-
passing the power of preemption took place during the second dec-
ade of this century.43
Prior to the beginning of this century, concurrent state and fed-
eral power was "genuine": that is, each sovereign possessed equal reg-
ulatory power subject only to the independent operation of the
Supremacy Clause. When the Supreme Court first unequivocally ac-
knowledged a Congressional power of preemption around 1912,44 this
original jurisdictional regime of concurrency plus supremacy gave way
to a regime of what I shall term the "latent exclusivity"45 of congres-
sional power. Under the new regime, the power of the states over
interstate commerce in particular was subordinate to that of Congress
in all cases of congressional action and not only in cases of conflict as
before. The form that this subordination took under the system of
latent exclusivity was that the power of the states ended as soon as
Congress chose to exercise its regulatory power in a given field. This
new regime of latent exclusivity was itself replaced in the 1930s by the
current one which, in principle at least, established genuinely concur-
rent power (concurrency plus supremacy) as the default situation, un-
less and until Congress clearly manifests its intent to end it.
B. First-Order Conflicts
Without question, the view that preemption derives from the
Supremacy Clause is the most important mistaken connection be-
tween these two distinct legal concepts, as it constitutes the premise
for much of the thinking about preemption. It is not, however, the
only misconception. The second contends that, regardless of the
42 See infra part IV.
43 This story forms the subject matter of part IV. The following is a summary.
44 See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
45 This phrase was suggested to me by my colleague, Tom Merrill.
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source of the power of preemption, state law is preempted under the
Supremacy Clause if it conflicts with federal law.4 6 In modem pre-
emption doctrine, this type of implied preemption is termed "conflict
preemption."
As the previous discussion should make clear, however, "conflict
preemption" is a contradiction in terms. The trumping of an other-
wise valid state law by supreme federal law is not an instance of pre-
emption at all. The state in question does not lose its concurrent
lawmaking powers, it is not deprived of the power to legislate in the
same area in the future. It can, for example, amend the trumped stat-
ute to avoid the conflict with federal law.
As noted earlier, this difference is not an empty one, involving
simply the shuffling of labels.47 First, whereas conflict is essential to
the application of supremacy, it is largely irrelevant to the issue of
preemption. Second, whereas preemption is a discretionary power
depending on the intent of Congress for its exercise, the principle of
supremacy operates automatically, without regard to such intent, to
trump conflicting state laws. Third, determining whether or not a
state law conflicts with a federal law is an ex post judicial matter, in-
volving first the interpretation of the state law in question and then an
evaluation of its compatibility with the federal law. Preemption, by
contrast, is an ex ante legislative exercise that does not involve the
interpretation of state laws.
C. Second-Order Conflicts
The third purported connection between preemption and
supremacy assumes that each case of preemption represents a second-
order conflict (between Congress's intent to displace state law and the
state's intent to regulate) that the Supremacy Clause resolves in favor
of Congress.
This argument regarding the exercise of the preemption power is
parallel to the one that derives the power from the Supremacy Clause
by translating preemption cases into cases of second-order conflicts.
The problem with the argument is similarly parallel: the Supremacy
Clause simply does not operate to resolve this case. If the federal stat-
ute clearly exhibits congressional intent to preempt state law (ex-
pressly or impliedly), then that is the end of the matter. No valid state
laws survive the exercise of Congress's power of preemption which
could conflict with the federal. Such exercise eradicates any and all
concurrent state lawmaking authority. With no valid state law remain-
ing to conflict with the relevant federal statute, no circumstances exist
46 See supra note 10.
47 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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after preemptive congressional action to implicate the Supremacy
Clause.
In sum, none of the purported connections between preemption
and supremacy is valid. The Necessary and Proper Clause, and not
the Supremacy Clause, provides the source and constitutional justifi-
cation for Congress's power to preempt state lawmaking capacity.
This power is not involved when the Supremacy Clause trumps a par-
ticular state law that conflicts with a federal statute. Finally, the
Supremacy Clause does not resolve second-order conflicts between
congressional intent to preempt and state attempts to regulate. If pre-
empted, state law is simply no longer valid.
III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PREEMPTION
The constitutional history of preemption that I shall recount in
this section serves two purposes. First, it provides historical support
for the conceptual analysis presented above, in particular the fact that
supremacy does not imply, and has little to do with, preemption. If
preemption were essentially connected with supremacy, one would ex-
pect the earliest cases concerning the relationship between federal
and state authority to have firmly acknowledged the power of preemp-
tion, as they acknowledged the principle of supremacy itself.48 The
fact is, however, that the courts did not recognize a clear and unequiv-
ocal power of preemption until the second decade of the twentieth
century, when state laws were overturned on preemption grounds for
the first time.
As will be clear from what follows, I am not arguing that no Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court ever accepted the power of preemption
before 1912, but rather, (a) that whether or not Congress had the
power to preempt state law was an unresolved, and at times highly
controversial, issue throughout the nineteenth century; (b) that, at
least before 1876, preemption was generally understood to be quite
distinct from, and a more radical intrusion upon state power than,
supremacy; and (c) that no state law was actually overturned on pre-
emption grounds until 1912.
4 9
For most of the nineteenth century, the Court typically decided
cases involving the relationship between state and federal power not
on preemption grounds, but on grounds of exclusivity or supremacy
alone. The structure of the Court's analysis was as follows: if congres-
sional (or state) power was exclusive, then states (or Congress) had no
power to legislate; but if congressional power was concurrent, then
48 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
49 See infra part III.C.
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only a conflict between the state and federal laws could invalidate the
state law, under the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, the characteristic
(and in some minds, notorious) importance attached to the categori-
zation of federal power as exclusive or concurrent in the nineteenth
century is itself evidence that Congress was not generally considered
to have the power of preemption. Where there is no such power, uni-
form national regulation can only be guaranteed through exclusive
federal jurisdiction. Conversely, once the power of preemption is ac-
knowledged, constitutional exclusivity becomes less crucial. 50 Uni-
form regulation can be attained in spite of concurrent state power by
preemptive congressional action to eliminate it.
The second purpose of this section is to demonstrate that, despite
the official position to the contrary, modem preemption doctrine has
in practice not sufficiently abandoned the quite different earlier ver-
sion of preemption established after 1910. Unlike modem preemp-
tion doctrine, which is focused exclusively on the (express or implied)
intent of Congress, the earlier doctrine operated automatically when-
ever Congress entered a field of regulation; thus, any federal regula-
tion of a given area automatically preempted all state regulation in the
same area.51 Under this regime, congressional "occupation of the
field" was the paradigmatic instance of preemption.
The concept of automatic preemption was itself derived from
confused thinking about supremacy: the preemption power was
thought to be implied by the fact that Congress's authority over inter-
state commerce was "paramount." Although automatic preemption
was officially replaced in the 1930s by an exclusive concern with con-
gressional intent,52 the retention of the doctrine of "field preemption"
is, in practice, inconsistent with the centrality of actual intent underly-
ing modem preemption law. Given its origins in the notion that con-
gressional "occupation of a field" automatically triggers Congress's
latently exclusive power, the doctrine of "field preemption" tends to
overlook actual intent, going beyond what ordinary principles of statu-
tory interpretation justify.55
50 Though less crucial, exclusivity is clearly not unimportant, as Professor Redish's
argument concerning the Dormant Commerce Clause makes clear. The practical, institu-
tional, and constitutional differences between requiring Congress to pass legislation on the
one hand, and relying on the Constitution to end state power in the absence of federal
legislation on the other, are clearly not negligible. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nu-
gent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.
569.
51 See Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, supra note 4, at 53.
52 See id. and infra note 196 and accompanying text.
53 See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
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A. The Early Cases
The United States Supreme Court did not clearly and unequivo-
cally recognize a congressional power of preemption until the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. In some of the earliest cases that are
often thought to affirm the power of preemption, the issue of pre-
emption properly understood simply did not arise. In others, the is-
sue arose but was highly controversial, and the Court often avoided its
resolution by deciding cases on other grounds.
This situation continued until the last quarter of the nineteenth
century when, for the first time, the issue of preemption became of
great practical importance due to the creation by Congress of the
early federal regulatory agencies under its power to regulate interstate
commerce, and the inevitable question that these agencies raised of
their impact on the traditional police powers of the states. As an insti-
tution, the Court's response during this latter period was to confuse
supremacy with preemption, never clearly choosing between the two.
It was only the urgent need for a clear answer, resulting from the con-
tinued rapid growth of federal regulation and the perceived need for
uniform national laws, that brought the issue to the fore in the early
part of this century.
The landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden54 is sometimes thought of
as the first case in which the Supreme Court affirmed the power of
preemption. 55 On this view, the Court in Gibbons held that the New
York statute granting Fulton and Livingston the exclusive right to op-
erate steamships between NewJersey and New York was preempted by
the 1793 federal statute, under which Gibbons's ferries were licensed
as "vessels employed in the coasting trade."
56
This interpretation of the Court's decision represents a classic in-
stance of the general failure to distinguish preemption from
supremacy, for ChiefJustice John Marshall's opinion rests on straight-
forward supremacy principles. Indeed, the case is notable as the first
major application, not of preemption, but of supremacy. Moreover,
the case is a good example of how the Court at this time used only the
two principles of supremacy and exclusivity as alternative means of
deciding issues of federalism.
For Marshall, the federal law trumped the New York law in ques-
tion because the two were in conflict. There is no suggestion in his
opinion that, as preemption implies, the issue of conflict was irrele-
vant once Congress had acted, nor that Congress's action terminated
the power of New York to legislate in this area. Marshall states:
54 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
55 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at 538.
56 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 212.
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Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating their own
purely internal affairs... the States may sometimes enact laws, the
validity of which depends on their interfering with, and being con-
trary to, an act of Congress .... the Court will enter upon the
inquiry, whether the laws of New York ... have, in their application
to this case, come into collision with an act of Congress .... Should
this collision exist ... the acts of New York must yield to the law of
Congress... .157
Somewhat later in the opinion, he adds:
The appropriate application of that part of the [Supremacy] clause
which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such
acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers,....
interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress .... In every
such case, the act of Congress ... is supreme; and the law of the
State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted,
must yield to it.58
In contrast, Justice Johnson took the alternative path in his con-
curring opinion, affirming the exclusivity of federal power to regulate
interstate commerce.5 9 ForJohnson, the state law was invalid not be-
cause the federal statute preempted the state's concurrent power to
pass such laws, but because, regardless of any federal action, the states
had no power ab initio in this area under the Constitution.60 He con-
cluded, "[t] he inferences, to be correctly drawn, from this whole arti-
cle, appear to me to be altogether in favour of the exclusive grants to
Congress of power over commerce .. -61 Thus, both Marshall and
Johnson invalidated the state law, but neither did so on the ground of
preemption.
The nearest the Supreme Court came to affirming a congres-
sional power to preempt state law during the first three quarters of the
nineteenth century was actually not Gibbons at all, but the case of Hous-
ton v. Moore,62 decided four years earlier in 1820. In Houston, the
Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute that provided for pun-
ishment of state militiamen who failed to appear when ordered into
service by the President of the United States. 63 The Court rejected
the defendant's claim that, under the relevant federal statute, he
could only lawfully be punished by the United States.64
57 Id. at 209-10.
58 Id. at 211.
59 Id. at 226. Although this was an argument in which Marshall found "great force,"
he felt it did not need to be resolved given the conflict between the two laws.
60 Id- at 227.
61 Id. at 236.
62 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
63 Id. at 26.
64 Id. at 27.
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Writing for the Court in a three-two decision, Justice Washington
upheld the state legislation on the ground that Congress had not in
fact preempted the state's concurrent power.65 His opinion, however,
strongly supported the existence of a general power of preemption
itself. Justice Story's concurring opinion, on the other hand, contains
an equally explicit and vehement denial of the power of preemption
in favor of supremacy alone.66 Despite this difference of view, what
Washington and Storey held in common, unlike their successors, was
the clear recognition that the two principles are significantly different:
supremacy is distinct from, and does not imply, preemption.
Justice Washington affirmed the power of preemption by
denying:
[the] novel and unconstitutional doctrine, that in cases where the
State governments have a concurrent power of legislation with the
national government, they [the states] may legislate upon any sub-
ject on which Congress has acted, provided the two laws are not in
terms, or in their operation, contradictory and repugnant to each
other.
67
Applying this principle, he concluded that:
the State Court Martial had a concurrentjurisdiction with the tribu-
nal pointed out by the acts of Congress to try a militia man who had
disobeyed the call of the President, and to enforce the laws of Con-
gress against such delinquent; and that this authority will remain to
be so exercised until it shall please Congress to vest it exclusively
elsewhere .... 68
65 Id. So far as I have been able to discover, the first appearance in the U.S. Reports
of the term "preemption," as it is used to describe the power at issue, is in a dissent (his
very first since joining the Court) byJustice Brandeis in New York Central R.R. v. Winfield,
244 U.S. 147, 169 (1917). "The contention that Congress has, by legislating on one branch
of a subject relative to interstate commerce, preempted the whole field..." Id. (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Both before this first use and up until the 1940s, the term "superseded" was
generally used to describe the phenomenon.
66 Houston, 18 U.S. at 49.
67 Id. at 24.
68 Id. at 32. Like his many successors, Washington did not identify or discuss the
source of the congressional power to preempt, but he did provide three abstract rationales
for the power. First, "[tio subject [the people] to the operation of two laws upon the same
subject, dictated by distinct wills, particularly in a case inflicting pains and penalties, is, to
my apprehension, something very much like oppression, if not worse." Id. at 23. Second,
when state law provides for the same type of punishment as federal law for a given offence,
but adds to the amount, the two laws are not repugnant in that both can be carried out.
Nevertheless, "the will of Congress is... thwarted and opposed." Id. at 22. Third, "[i]fthe
other [state] legislature impose[s] a different punishment, in kind or degree, I am at a loss
to conceive how they can both consist harmoniously together." Id. at 23.
Washington's concern over the existence of two laws enacted by two different entities
on the same subject, appears to stem in part from the same metaphysical problem with the
general concept of divided sovereignty that characterized pre-modem theorists of the
state. See, e.g., JuLLA_ FRANsmc, JEAN BODIN AND THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1976). It
also stemmed from a perceived threat of tyranny posed by dual sovereigns. Both of these
1994]
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Story borrowed directly from
Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist.69 He argued that the power of
the states is concurrent with that of Congress except where:
the constitution has expressly in terms given an exclusive power to
Congress, or [where] the exercise of a like power is prohibited to the
States, or there is a direct repugnancy or incompatibility in the exer-
cise of it by the States. The example ... of the third class ... [is] the
power to establish an uniform rule of naturalization .... 70
Story continued,
In all other cases. . it seems unquestionable that the States retain
concurrent authority with Congress .... There is this reserve, how-
ever, that in cases of concurrent authority, where the laws of the
States and of the Union are in direct and manifest collision on the
same subject, those of the Union being 'the supreme law of the
land,' are of paramount authority, and the State laws, so far, and so
far only, as such incompatibility exists must necessarily yield.
7 '
Story thus clearly rejected Washington's view that Congress possesses
the power of preemption, contending that only the principle of
supremacy regulates concurrent federal and state powers.
Justice Johnson also wrote a concurring opinion in Houston.72
Although not as forthright, he undoubtedly sided with Story.73 He
attacked:
the exploded doctrine, that within the scope in which Congress may
legislate, the States shall not legislate. That they cannot, when legis-
lating within that ceded region of power, run counter to the laws of
Congress, is denied by no one; but ... to reason against the exercise
of this power from the possible abuse of it, is not for a court of
justice. When instances of this opposition occur, it will be time
enough to meet them.
74
reasons underlying his concern were, of course, transcended by the very structure of the
U.S. Constitution, which famously divided sovereignty in the name of liberty. See THE FED-
ERALtsT No. 51 (James Madison). In any event, the potential for two laws upon the same
subject results from the very definition of concurrent powers, so that Washington's argu-
ment is really an argument for exclusivity, not preemption.
In addition, to assert that congressional will should not be thwarted in the absence of
conflict is to assume the power to preempt, because if Congress has no such power, its will
may certainly be thwarted. Since this is the very power that Washington sought to derive,
his argument clearly begs the question. Washington's third argument seems to reduce the
issue to one of conflict. As stated throughout this Article, however, conflict is irrelevant to
the issue of preemption.
69 See THE FEDERALsr No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
70 Houston, 18 U.S. at 49.
71 Id, at 49-50 (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 32.
73 At the end of his own opinion, Washington stated that "[the other judges" in the
majority (referring to Story and Johnson) "do not concur in all respects in the reasons
which influence my opinion." Id.
74 Id. at 45.
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Nine years after Houston, the Court again considered how the
Constitution regulates concurrent powers. In Willson v. Black Bird
Creek Marsh,75 the Court found that supremacy was the only constitu-
tional principle other than the Dormant Commerce Clause that could
invalidate the state statute in question. 76 Chief Justice Marshall, writ-
ing for the Court, concluded that the state statute permitting the de-
fendant to erect a dam could not "under all the circumstances of the
case, be considered as repugnant to the [federal] power to regulate
commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any [fed-
eral] law passed on the subject."77 The Court did not consider pre-
emption as a third potential basis for evaluating the statute's validity.
In City of New York v. Miln,78 the Supreme Court upheld a New
York statute that required masters of ships arriving in New York from
abroad or from another state to report the names and nationalities of
all passengers. The plaintiff, New York City, brought an action in debt
to recover the $15,000 penalty from the defendant, who had violated
the statute.7 9 The defendant argued that the state statute was an un-
constitutional violation of Congress's exclusive power to regulate com-
merce.80 The plaintiff countered first, that the statute was an exercise
of the police power reserved exclusively to the states under the Tenth
Amendment;8 ' and alternatively, that if the statute were considered a
regulation of commerce, it was valid because the states had concur-
rent power and there was no conflict with any act of Congress.8
2
The Court decided in favor of the plaintiff on the police power
ground,83 but it also offered interesting dicta on the supremacy/pre-
emption issue. Writing for the Court, Justice Barbour stated that if
the New York statute had been deemed a regulation of commerce
rather than an exercise of the state's police power, then it would have
been valid under the principle of concurrency plus supremacy.
[W] hilst a state is acting within the legitimate scope of its power as to
the end to be attained, it may use whatsoever means, being appro-
priate to that end, it may think fit; although they may be the same,
or so nearly the same, as scarcely to be distinguishable from those
adopted by congress acting under a different power: subject, only,
75 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). The Court here first used the term "dormant" to
describe that aspect of the Commerce Clause which prevents states from unreasonably
burdening interstate commerce, even in the absence of relevant federal legislation. See
Redish & Nugent, supra note 50, at 577.
76 Wison, 27 U.S. at 252.
77 Id.
78 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
79 Id. at 104.
80 Id. at 118.
81 Id. at 112.
82 Id. at 127.
83 Id. at 132.
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say the Court, to this limitation, that in the event of collision, the
law of the state must yield to the law of congress.
8 4
After summarizing the two relevant congressional statutes concerning
shipping passengers, Barbour concluded that:
there is, then, no collision between the law in question, and the acts
of Congress just commented on; and, therefore, if the state law were
to be considered as partaking of the nature of a commercial regula-
tion; it would stand the test of the most rigid scrutiny, if tried by the
standard laid down in the reasoning of the Court, quoted from the
case of Gibbons against Ogden.
85
In the infamous 1842 case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,8 6 the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute making it a felony,
inter alia, to return a fugitive slave who had escaped to the state of
Pennsylvania.8 7 Counsel for Prigg, the defendant bounty hunter, con-
tended that the Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional on any one
of three grounds: (a) that Congress has exclusive power to legislate on
the subject of fugitive slaves;88 (b) that even if Congress's power is not
exclusive, state power to legislate was preempted ("suspended")8 9 by
the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793; and (c) that if not preempted,
the state statute is in conflict with the federal, and thus falls on
supremacy principles. 90
Once again, there is clear acknowledgement that the second and
third grounds are distinct 91 and, by implication from the ordering of
the grounds, that supremacy represents the smallest intrusion upon
state sovereignty. Moreover, as in Gibbons, Houston, Willson, and Miln,
the Court did not decide the case on the basis of a congressional
power to preempt state legislation. The Court based its decision on
the first argument, that federal power to legislate on the subject was
exclusive.9
2
Several members of the Court, however, took the opportunity to
discuss the other two claims. Justice Story's opinion for the Court rep-
resented a complete volte-face from his earlier anti-preemption posi-
tion in Houston v. Moore.93 Moreover, as sole precedent for affirming
the preemption power he cited the very language ofJustice Washing-
84 Id. at 137.
85 Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
86 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
87 Id. at 608.
88 Id. at 610.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 This acknowledgement runs counter to the current understanding that conflict is a
sub-category of preemption, and constitutes evidence of congressional intent to preempt.
See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). See also infra part V.A.
92 Id. at 625.
93 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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ton in Houston with which (as we have seen) he had squarely taken
issue in his own opinion in that case. 94 Justice Taney's concurring
opinion in Prigg decided the case on supremacy grounds, rejecting
both the majority's reliance on exclusive federal power and the exis-
tence of a power of preemption.95 Justice Daniel similarly concurred
on supremacy grounds, denying both exclusivity and preemption.95
In rejecting the power of preemption, Daniel took the liberty of quot-
ing a large section of Story's opinion in Houston v. Moore to the effect
that state law is invalid only when it conflicts with federal law.
97
The next important case dealing with the issues of exclusivity,
preemption and supremacy is Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Phila-
delphia, decided in 1851.98 The Court upheld an 1803 Pennsylvania
statute requiring all ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia
to use a local pilot or pay a fine that was used to support retired pilots
and their dependents.9 9 In a two-step analysis, the Court first found
that the state statute constituted a regulation of commerce, but con-
cluded that the Constitution granted concurrent powers to the states
and the federal government on the particular subject-matter of pi-
lots.'00 Second, the Court held that the Pennsylvania law was valid
because it did not conflict with the two relevant acts of Congress.101
Injustice Curtis's words:
We are of opinion that this State law was enacted by virtue of a
power, residing in the State to legislate; that it is not in conflict with
any law of Congress; that it does not interfere with any system which
Congress has established by making regulations, or by intentionally
94 Pigg, 41 U.S. at 617-18.
If [the federal statute covers the field of fugitive slaves], then it would seem,
upon just principles of construction that the legislation of Congress, if con-
stitutional, must supersede all state legislation upon the same subject; and
by necessary implication prohibit it. For if Congress have a constitutional
power to regulate a particular subject, and they do actually regulate it in a
given manner, and in a certain form, it cannot be that the state legislatures
have a right to interfere; and, as it were, by way of complement to the legis-
lation of Congress, to prescribe additional regulations, and what they may
deem auxiliary provisions for the same purpose. In such a case, the legisla-
tion of Congress, in what it does prescribe, manifestly indicates that it does
not intend that there shall be any farther legislation to act upon the subject-
matter.... This doctrine was fully recognised by this Court, in the case of Houston
v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 1, 21, 22 (emphasis added).
Id.
95 Id. at 627.
96 Id. at 651.
97 Id. at 654-55.
98 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
99 Id. at 312.
100 Id. at 320.
101 Id. at 315.
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leaving individuals to their own unrestricted action; that this law is
therefore valid .... 102
The first step of the Court's analysis, enumerating a test to resolve
whether the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is exclu-
sive or concurrent with the states, made Cooley a landmark case.'
03
Under the Cooley test, "whatever subjects of this [Commerce Clause]
power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform sys-
tem, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as
to require exclusive legislation by Congress."10 4 All other subjects that
Congress is authorized to regulate, including pilots, give rise to con-
current power. 10 5 Thus, Cooley again illustrates the dominant concep-
tual framework for dealing with federalism issues: either federal
power is exclusive, or the principle of concurrency plus supremacy
determines the validity of a particular state law.
Notably, Justice Curtis expressly denied resolving the problem of
preemption, or, as he put it, the "general question how far any regula-
tion of a subject by Congress, may be deemed to operate as an exclu-
sion of all legislation by the States upon the same subject."10 6 This
express avoidance of the question of preemption surely indicates that
it was far from settled in 1851.107
Interestingly, the Cooley test presents exclusivity of federal power
as answering the need for uniform national regulation: where the
subject-matter is such that there is a need for national laws, Congress
102 Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
103 Justice McLean, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the power was exclusive. Id. at
323. (McLean,J., dissenting) Note again that this issue of concurrency or exclusivity is less
crucial once the power of preemption is recognized. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
104 Id. at 319.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 320.
107 There are two suggestions in Curtis' opinion that might be read to contradict my
interpretation of it as supporting "concurrency plus supremacy" rather than "concurrency
plus preemption." Curtis stated as settled precedent that "it is not the mere existence of
such a power, but its exercise by Congress, which may be incompatible with the exercise of
the same power by the States .... " Id at 319. The use of "may be incompatible" indicates
that there is some other requirement that must be met if the state law is to be deemed
invalid. Of course, it is my thesis that this additional requirement is the need for conflict
between the two exercises of power.
Later, having noted that the mere grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce
did not deprive the states of their own right to do so, Curtis continued, "that although
Congress has legislated on this subject, its legislation manifests an intention ... to leave its
regulation to the several States." Id. at 320. This might be interpreted in line with modem
preemption doctrine requiring congressional intent to preempt. See infra notes 196-203
and accompanying text. Read in context, this passage does not suggest that congressional
intent is the end of the inquiry. It would be internally consistent to understand these
words to mean that intent may be evidence of conflict. Thus, even if Congress intended to
regulate the subject, this intent would only be given legal effect if the resulting legislation
conflicted substantively with that of the states.
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has exclusive power.'08 However, uniform laws can clearly be based
either on exclusivity or on preemption. Indeed, insofar as the per-
ceived need for uniform laws will often be in response to the inade-
quacies and inefficiencies of specific disparate state regulation,10 9
preemption of state power provides a more useful basis for uniformity
than exclusivity. By assuming that the practical need for uniform na-
tional laws in certain areas requires exclusivity of federal power, how-
ever, the Cooley Court illustrates the contemporary view that Congress
did not possess the general power of preemption.
B. Confusion and Ambivalence: 1875-1912
In terms of the constitutional history of preemption, three fea-
tures characterize the period from 1875 to 1912. First, as in the previ-
ous period, no state statute was overturned on preemption grounds
(the first such case comes in 1912110). Second, during this period,
Justice Stephen Field's test of direct or indirect effect on interstate
commerce replaced the Cooley test for determining whether Con-
gress's power is exclusive or concurrent under the Commerce Clause.
Henceforth, regulation having direct effect on interstate commerce
was a matter of exclusive congressional power, but where the effect on
interstate commerce was merely indirect, state power to regulate was
at least concurrent with that of Congress.' Third, in cases of concur-
rent state power under either the Cooley or Field tests, there was both
confusion and ambivalence regarding the impact of federal legisla-
tion: does general state power in an area end where there is any fed-
eral legislation in that same area (preemption), or is it only that
particular state laws are trumped if they conflict with federal legisla-
tion (supremacy)?112
In a series of opinions in the 1870s and 1880s, Justice Field con-
clusively stated (though always by means of dicta) his own answer to
the "general question" of preemption consciously left open in Coo-
108 The Cooley Court implicitly adopted the orthodox view that the express grant of
power to pass uniform laws in the areas of bankruptcy and naturalization created exclusive
congressional power. Cooey, 53 U.S. at 318. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamil-
ton). It then applied the presumed rationale behind this express grant in a radically func-
tionalist manner to cover any area requiring uniform laws. Cooky, 53 U.S. at 318-19.
Henceforth, wherever national regulation was called for, congressional power over that
area would be exclusive.
109 Such inefficiencies might include negative externalities of state regulation and the
loss of economies of scale to be derived from national regulation.
110 Southern Ry. Co. v. Reed, 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
111 I say "at least concurrent" because, until the revolution of the New Deal period,
there were still areas of intrastate regulation, albeit with indirect effects on interstate com-
merce, that remained exclusively matters of state power.
112 At stake here was "automatic preemption," whereby state power ends automatically
once Congress has acted in a given area, rather than the modem form, which requires
congressional intent to preempt. See Engdahl, supra note 51, at 53; see also infra part III.C.
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/&y.113 Field's approach was too definitive and unqualified for his col-
leagues, however, and only came to command clear and informed
consent in the second decade of the twentieth century.
Field first announced a general congressional power of preemp-
tion in Welton v. Missouri,"x 4 decided twenty-four years after Cooley.
The case involved a Missouri statute requiring peddlers to pay a li-
cense tax for selling goods that originated in states other than Mis-
souri." 5 Although Welton is generally known as an early Dormant
Commerce Clause case," 6 Field affirmed a general power of preemp-
tion in setting out the constitutional framework for the decision."
7
By his explicit appeal to precedent, Field claimed simply to be
applying the Cooley framework to determine the federalism issues
raised by state regulation of the interstate movement of goods.118 In
fact, he changed this framework from one affirming supremacy to one
affirming preemption. Field described the test as follows:
So far as some of these instruments [for regulating commerce] are
concerned, and some subjects which are local in their operation, it
has been held that the States may provide regulations until Congress
acts with reference to them; but where the subject to which the
power applies is national in its character, or of such a nature as to
admit of uniformity of regulation, the power is exclusive of all State
authority. 119
In applying this test, Field found that congressional power was exclu-
sive because "that portion of commerce.., which consists in the trans-
portation and exchange of commodities is of national importance,
and admits and requires uniformity of regulation."' 20 The state regu-
lation in question was, therefore, unconstitutional. 121 In addition, the
state law violated the provision of the Constitution prohibiting a state
from laying "any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports" without
the consent of Congress.
122
Field's (mis) statement of the first part of the Cooley test, which
deals with concurrent powers, is of more significance than his conclu-
sion. As we have seen, the Cooley Court held that the principles of
concurrency and supremacy would determine the outcome where the
113 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
114 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
115 Id. at 277.
116 In other words, there are constitutional constraints on state power contained in the
Commerce Clause, even in the absence of federal legislation. See Redish & Nugent, supra
note 50, at 579-80.





122 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
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subject-matter of regulation is local in character. 23 It specifically left
open the "general question" of preemption: "how far any regulation
of a subject by Congress may be deemed to operate as an exclusion of
all legislation by the States upon the same subject."124 By claiming
that the states may regulate until Congress acts,125 Field answered
this question: the principles of concurrency and preemption-not
supremacy-determine the outcome. Moreover, by prefacing this
claim with "it has been held that,"126 Field unjustifiably sought to wrap
the power of preemption in the legitimating shroud of precedent.
27
Reiterating his position on preemption the following year, Field
abandoned the Cooley test for exclusivity/concurrency, asking instead
whether state action directly or indirectly affects interstate commerce.
In Sherlock v. Alling,128 the Court upheld an Indiana statute against a
Commerce Clause challenge. The statute granted a right of action to
a decedent's personal representatives when death was caused by a tort
committed within the state. 129 Writing for the Court, Field an-
nounced a new exclusivity/concurrency test, in which only the direct
regulation of interstate commerce is constitutionally outside the
power of the states.1 30 Finding concurrent state power in this area
under this test, he concluded that "[u] ntil Congress, therefore, makes
some regulation touching the liability of parties for marine torts result-
ing in the death of the persons injured, we are of the opinion that the
statute of Indiana applies... and that ... it constitutes no encroach-
ment upon the commercial power of Congress." 131 The difference
between preemption and supremacy is precisely the difference be-
tween the sufficiency of "some" federal regulation and the necessity of
"conflicting" regulation for the non-application of state law.
In Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Alabama,132 de-
cided in 1888, Field expressed a similar position.
123 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
126 Id.
127 Based on this general power of preemption, Field hints at a third ground for the
decision.
The fact that Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific rules to
govern inter-State commerce does not affect the question. Its inaction on
this subject, when considered with reference to its legislation with respect
to foreign commerce, is equivalent to a declaration that inter-State com-
merce shall be free and untrammeled. As the main object of that com-
merce is the sale and exchange of commodities, the policy thus established
would be defeated by discriminating legislation like that of Missouri.
Welton, 91 U.S. at 282.
128 93 U.S. 99 (1876).
129 Id. at 100.
130 Id. at 103.
131 Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
132 128 U.S. 96 (1888).
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It is conceded that the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce is plenary; that, as incident to it, Congress may legislate
as to the qualifications, duties, and liabilities of employe's and
others on railway trains engaged in that commerce; and that such
legislation will supersede any state action on the subject. But until such
legislation is had, it is clearly within the competency of the States to
provide against accidents on trains whilst within their limits.'
33
Once again, as in every such case until the second decade of the next
century, the state law was upheld.
Field's position supporting preemption was thus confined to
dicta and was not invoked as grounds for invalidating any state law
during this period. More importantly, his position on preemption did
not attain a consensus on the Court until much later. But rather than
the explicit and principled disagreements on the issue that we saw in
the previous period, this period was generally characterized by confu-
sion regarding the difference between supremacy and preemption. In
the brief respites from confusion, ambivalence about the existence of
the latter power reigned.
For example, in the 1886 case of Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisi-
ana Board of Health,'34 the Court upheld a Louisiana quarantine stat-
ute that required a sanitary inspection and fee for all vessels entering
New Orleans against Commerce Clause and import duty chal-
lenges. 135 Rejecting the former claim, the Court first applied the Coo-
ley test to establish concurrent state power.'36 Then, in determining
the continuing validity of the state statute, the Court stated:
But it may be conceded that whenever Congress shall undertake to
provide.., a general system of quarantine ... all State laws on the
subject will be abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent. But,
until this is done, the laws of the State on the subject are valid.'
3 7
Unfortunately, because there was no federal legislation on the subject
with which to compare that of Louisiana,138 the case does not provide
a practical example of applying the difference between supremacy
and preemption that the Court's opinion acknowledged.
Two years later, in Smith v. Alabama,'3 9 the Court considered an
Alabama statute requiring licensing of locomotive engineers by a state
board of examiners. In discussing the issue of concurrency, the Court
stated that the power of Congress "might... be exercised in prescrib-
ing the qualifications for locomotive engineers employed by railroad
133 Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added).
134 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
135 Id. at 459.
136 Id. at 463.
137 Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
138 Id. at 466.
139 124 U.S. 465 (1888).
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companies engaged in the transportation of passengers and goods
among the States, and in that case would supersede any conflicting
provisions on the same subject made by local authority."140 The Court
upheld the state statute, finding that such regulations "are parts of
that body of the local laws which ... properly governs the relation
between carriers of passengers and merchandise and the public who
employ them, which are not displaced until they come in conflict with express
enactments of Congress in the exercise of its power over commerce."
14'
Again, in Hennington v. Georgia,142 the Supreme Court upheld a
Georgia statute against the by now familiar Commerce Clause chal-
lenge. Holding that the statute banning the operation of freight
trains on Sundays was a valid exercise of the state's police power, 14
3
Justice Harlan set out the general principles upon which continuing
concurrent power depends as follows:
Of course, if the inspection, quarantine or health laws of a State,
passed under its reserved power to provide for the health, comfort
and safety of its people, come into conflict with an act of Congress,
passed under its power to regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce, such local regulations, to the extent of the conflict, must give way
in order that the supreme law of the land-an act of Congress
passed in pursuance of the Constitution-may have unobstructed
operation. 4
4
Having thus stated that supremacy, not preemption, is the test of va-
lidity for concurrent state powers, Harlan then demonstrated confu-
sion about the difference between the two. In the space of a couple of
pages in his opinion, he quoted approvingly both the passage from
Field's opinion in Nashville stating that congressional action "will su-
persede any state action on the subject"145 and the passage from Smith
v. Alabama 46 that congressional action "would supersede any conflict-
ing provisions on the same subject made by the local authority."147
Confusion is again evident in Harlan's opinion for the Court in
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. New York148 At
one point, Harlan stated that "it was clearly competent for the State of
New York, in the absence of national legislation covering the subject, to for-
bid under penalties the heating of passenger cars in that State, by
stoves or furnaces kept inside the cars."149 Later, he claims that:
140 Id. at 479-80.
141 Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
142 163 U.S. 299 (1896).
143 Id. at 318.
144 Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
145 1&. at 316-17 (emphasis added).
146 124 U.S. 465 (1888) (emphasis added).
147 Id. at 479-80.
148 165 U.S. 628 (1897).
149 Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
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[E] ach State has plenary authority within its territorial limits to pro-
vide for the safety of the public, according to its own views of neces-
sity and public policy, and so long as Congress deems it wise not to
establish regulations on the subject that would displace any inconsis-
tent regulations of the States covering the same ground.
150
Upholding a Kansas statute protecting cattle against contagious
disease in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Haber,151 Harlan deliv-
ered an opinion that seemed to affirm that concurrent state powers
are regulated only by the principle of supremacy. Whether the statute
could stand in light of the federal Animal Industry Act of 1893, he
said,
[M] ust of course be determined with reference to the settled rule that
a statute enacted in execution of a reserved power of the State is not
to be regarded as inconsistent with an act of Congress passed in the
execution of a clear power under the Constitution, unless the repug-
nance or conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be recon-
ciled or stand together.'
52
And citing Gibbons and the 1857 case of Sinnot v. Davenport'5 3 as sup-
port, he found that "a state statute, although enacted in pursuance of
a power not surrendered to the General Government, must in the exe-
cution of its provisions yield in case of conflict to a statute constitu-
tionally enacted under authority conferred upon Congress."'
54
In Reid v. Colorado, however, this apparent clarity again dissolved
into confusion.155 After first expressing the preemption position,1
56
Harlan then proceeded in successive sentences to assert both preemp-
tion and supremacy:
It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or by its
legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the States,
even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is
clearly manifested. This Court has said-and the principle has
been often reaffirmed-that "in the application of this principle of
supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the State law is but
the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should
be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled
or consistently stand together."
157
150 Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
151 169 U.S. 613 (1898).
152 Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
153 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227 (1859).
154 169 U.S. at 626.
155 187 U.S. 137 (1902).
156 "So that when the entire subject of the transportation of live stock from one State
to another is taken under direct national supervision .... au local or State regulations in
respect of such matters and covering the same ground will cease to have any force, whether
formally abrogated or not." Id. at 146-47 (emphasis added).
157 Id. at 148.
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C. Preemption Established: 1912-1920
The period from 1912-1920 marked the end of the prevailing
confusion, with the Court issuing for the first time consistently clear
and explicit statements of genuine preemption principles. It is not
merely conflicting state laws that are overridden by federal law on the
same subject, but any state laws-even those that are consistent with
and supplement federal law.'58 The effect of congressional action is
to end the concurrent power of the states and thereby to create exclu-
sive power at the federal level from that time on.
During this period, the Court overturned many state regulations
explicitly on the ground of the newly recognized power.159 Moreover,
it rejected a number of others as unconstitutional under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 60 This double shift in the direction of enhanced
federal power, which was in stark contrast to the Court's practice of
almost always upholding state laws during the previous century, was
undoubtedly driven by a perception that uniform regulation, espe-
cially (but not only) of the railroads, had become a national neces-
sity.' 61 Much of the academic literature during this period reflected
both this perception and the controversy which the response to it
aroused.16
2
Three interrelated features characterize the power of preemption
established by the Court at this time. First, preemption was an auto-
matic consequence of congr6ssional action in a given field. There was
no systematic reference to congressional intent as the necessary trig-
ger for preemption; rather, where the states and Congress had con-
current power, "that of the State [was] superseded when the power of
Congress [over interstate commerce was] exercised."
63
Second, automatic preemption by occupation of a field was inter-
preted as resulting from the nature of Congress's power over inter-
state commerce-a power that, in jurisdictional terms, can be
described by the idea of "latent exclusivity." As a statement of Con-
gress's power over interstate commerce, neither exclusive nor concur-
rent power satisfied the Court: exclusive power would have left too
158 Again, congressional intent, as a qualification on the automatic preemptive effect
of federal legislation, was not generally recognized until the 1930s. See supra note 52.
159 See ALEXANDER BICKEL & BENNO SCHMIDT, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERN-
MENT, 1910-1921, at 264-76 (1984) for details of some of the other preemption decisions
during this period.
160 Id.
161 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Rail-
road Problemn, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1988).
162 See, e.g., Woodrow Wilson, The States and the Federal Governmen 187 N. AM. REv. 684
(1908); Henry Wade Rogers, The Constitution and the New Federalism, 188 N. AM. REv. 321
(1908); Philip Allen, States With Ideas of Their Own, 190 N. AM. REv. 515 (1909).
163 222 U.S. 424, 436 (1912).
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many areas unregulated, and concurrent power belittled Congress's
special role and responsibility in the area. Thus, the Court developed
a third possibility, that of latent exclusivity, giving Congress more than
concurrent power but less than exclusive power ab initio. The states
had "permissive" power to act until Congress exercised its "inherent"
power under the Commerce Clause.164 In short, congressional action
created exclusive congressional power, aptly described by the meta-
phor of "occupying the field." This action itself was deemed to have
automatic preemptive effect, rendering any determination of congres-
sional intent irrelevant and unnecessary. Latent exclusivity was, there-
fore, understood more as a doctrine about the constitutional division
of interstate commerce powers than as a general, discretionary power
of Congress.
Third, automatic preemption and latent exclusivity were believed
to be implications of the Supremacy Clause. Time and again, the
Court stated that its preemption doctrine resulted from the "para-
mount" power that the Supremacy Clause grants to Congress over in-
terstate commerce.' 65 This reasoning exhibits the conventional
modem confusion. "Paramountcy" under the Supremacy Clause does
not imply preemption, but rather implies concurrency plus the
supremacy of federal law in cases of conflict.' 66 Absent conflict, state
and federal power is co-equal. Supremacy means that Congress "pre-
scribe[s] the final and dominant rule,"' 67 not that it may prescribe all
the rules. The Court's concept of Congress's paramount power over
interstate commerce actually had nothing to do with supremacy.
Rather, it meant that because Congress has primary responsibility for
the regulation of interstate commerce (in the interests of a single na-
tional market), more than the regime of concurrency plus supremacy
is required: latent exclusivity is necessary as a third type of jurisdic-
tion. And, as discussed earlier, 68 latent exclusivity does not derive
from Congress's paramount power under the Supremacy Clause, but
from the Necessary and Proper Clause.
164 Justice Harlan used these terms in Reid See supra note 155.
165 See, e.g., Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co.,
226 U.S. 426 (1913). "[It must follow in consequence of the action of Congress... that
the power of the State over the subject-matter ceased to exist from the moment that Con-
gress exerted its paramount and all embracing authority over the subject. We say this be-
cause the elementary and long settled doctrine is that there can be no divided authority
over interstate commerce and that the regulations of Congress on that subject are supreme."
Id. at 435 (emphasis added). See also Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 146 ("any specified
rule or regulation in respect of such [live stock] transportation, which Congress may law-
fully prescribe or authorize and which may properly be deemed a regulation of such com-
merce, is paramount throughout the union.") (emphasis added).
166 See supra part I.
167 Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914).
168 See supra part I.
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Although the term "preemption" did not appear in this context
in the U.S. Reports until 1917 and did not gain currency until the
early 1950s,169 the first Supreme Court case actually decided on pre-
emption grounds was Southern Railway Co. v. Reid.170 At issue in Reid
was a North Carolina statute requiring railroad companies to trans-
port tendered freight. 171 The Court overturned the state statute on
the ground that, as a result of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress
had "taken possession of the field" of railroad rate regulation. 172 Con-
sequently, the state no longer had concurrent power to regulate this
aspect of the behavior of interstate railroad companies. 173 In setting
out the principles governing the case, the Court stated that "[i] t is well
settled that if the State and Congress have a concurrent power, that of
the State is superseded when the power of Congress is exercised."' 74
All that was needed to find preemption was "specific action" by Con-
gress "covering the matters which the statute of North Carolina at-
tempts to regulate."'1 75 The Court concluded that the Interstate
Commerce Act constituted such action and that therefore, through it,
Congress had "taken control of the subject of rate making and
charging."176
In his opinion for the Court, Justice McKenna introduced much
of what would become the standard terminology of preemption analy-
sis, a terminology quite different from that employed under the tradi-
tional supremacy analysis of Gibbons and its progeny considered
above. 177 Instead of the Gibbons-style language of two valid laws in
conflict, McKenna spoke of "a Federal exertion of authority which
takes from a State the power to regulate the duties of interstate carri-
ers,"178 and of Congress having "taken possession of the field," thereby
imposing "affirmative duties upon the carriers which the State cannot
even supplement."'179
By prefacing his discussion of the legal principles governing pre-
emption analysis with the phrase "it is well settled that. . ,"180 Mc-
Kenna provided the tell-tale sign that new law was being made.
Further indication of this comes from the fact that, despite the new,
clear language of preemption, McKenna supported the preemption
169 See supra note 65.
170 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
171 Id. at 431.
172 Id. at 442.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 436.
175 Id. at 437.
176 Id. at 438.
177 See supra part III.A.
178 Reid, 222 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added).
179 Id. (emphasis added).
180 Id. at 436.
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ground of the decision with both a Supremacy and a Dormant Com-
merce Clause argument.' 8 ' In the latter part of the opinion, he
stressed the actual conflict between the relevant provisions of the In-
terstate Commerce Act and the North Carolina statute,8 2 a conflict
that is essentially irrelevant under the preemption analysis set forth in
the first part of his opinion. Finding that the two laws are "directly
contradictory" 83 and that the state statute "conflicts" 18 4 with the re-
quirements of the congressional act, he concluded:
What they [the federal regulations] forbid the carrier to do the
[state] statute requires him to do....
... If the carrier obey the state law, he incurs the penalties of
the Federal law; if he obey the Federal law, he incurs the penalties
of the state law. Manifestly one authority must be paramount. 8 5
In addition, McKenna argued that the state statute would be invalid
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, as a burden on interstate com-
merce. This padding at the end of the opinion should not, however,
detract from the radical nature of the grounds upon which this case
was decided. That this was acknowledged at the time is evidenced
both by the immediate adoption of its new terminology of preemp-
tion, and by the frequent citing of Reid as the original precedent in
the many preemption decisions over the course of the next decade. 8 6
The following year, the Court consolidated this new preemption
analysis, invalidating state regulations without relying on the supple-
mental Supremacy and Dormant Commerce Clause analyses. Citing
Reid as the sole precedent for the governing principles of law,'8 7 the
Court in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Eleva-
tor Co.' 8s overturned a Minnesota statute regulating the delivery of in-
terstate cars as preempted by the Hepburn Act of 1906. ChiefJustice
White stated the principles of automatic preemption (and its sup-
posed derivation from supremacy) as follows:
[I] t must follow in consequence of [the Hepburn Act] that the power
of the State over the subject-matter ceased to exist from the moment that
Congress exerted its paramount and all embracing authority over
the subject. We say this because the elementary and long settled
doctrine is that there can be no divided authority over interstate
181 Id. at 441-42.
182 Id. at 441.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 442.
185 Id.
186 See, e.g., infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
187 226 U.S. 426, 435 (1913).
188 Id.
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commerce and that the regulations of Congress on that subject are
supreme189
Affirming the notion of latent exclusivity, White noted that Congress's
action "covers the whole field and renders the State impotent to deal
with a subject over which it had no inherent but only permissive
power."190 These are clear statements that congressional action auto-
matically deprives the states of the power to pass any laws at all on the
subject, conflicting or otherwise. In short, preemption eliminates the
need to consider the content of state laws on the subject, to lay the
two laws side by side to ascertain whether or not they conflict.
In the 1915 case of Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v.
Varnville,191 Justice Holmes unequivocally set forth the full implica-
tions of the new preemption analysis. Overturning a South Carolina
statute1 92 as preempted by the Hepburn Act, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that the statute did not conflict with, but aided,
congressional policy. Holmes explained that the presence or absence
of conflict is irrelevant where preemption is concerned, and clearly
affirmed the automatic nature of the preemptive power. "[T]hat [the
alleged absence of conflict] is immaterial. When Congress has taken
the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as
opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it
attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go."
19 3
D. Modern Preemption Doctrine: The Centrality of Intent
The power of preemption that was firmly established for the first
time during the second decade of this century should be understood
in proper historical context. Even if not directly part of the broader
movement to enhance the powers of the federal government that
characterized an important strand of the progressive movement,
194
the establishment of preemption was animated by similar concerns
about the need for effective national regulatory powers. As we have
189 Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
190 Id. (emphasis added).
191 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
192 The statute imposed a penalty on carriers for failure to settle claims within forty
days. Id. at 601.
193 Id. at 604. Similarly, in New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. Tonsellito, 244
U.S. 360 (1917), Justice McReynolds confirmed that all state law was preempted by the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, regardless of content. "Congress having declared when,
how far, and to whom carriers shall be liable on account of accidents in the specified class,
such liability can neither be extended nor abridged by common or statutory laws of the
State." Id. at 362.
194 One of the best-known historians of the period refers to this strand of the progres-
sive movement as "New Nationalism." See ARTHUR LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PRO-
GRESSIvE ERA 1-25 (1954). Apart from Theodore Roosevelt, the most celebrated
contemporary proponent of New Nationalism was probably Herbert Croly. See HERBERT
CROLY, Ti PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909).
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seen, the preemptive power was automatic, based on a new jurisdic-
tional concept of latent exclusivity that was incorrectly thought to fol-
low from the "paramount" nature of federal power over interstate
commerce granted by the Supremacy Clause.
195
By the 1930s, a second and greater movement to extend national
powers was under way. In this new context, the preemption power was
qualified by replacing its automatic element with a new requirement
that a federal statute would be considered to have taken over a given
field only if Congress clearly manifested its intent to do so. Thus, at a
time of radical increases in the general power of Congress at the ex-
pense of the states, it is perhaps paradoxical that Congress's preemp-
tive power was seemingly curtailed.
This new requirement of intent was, however, a logical result of
the restructuring of American federalism that began with the New
Deal in 1933 and that was judicially affirmed in 1937.196 The greatly
enlarged power granted to Congress by the new interpretation of the
Commerce Clause took from the states their previously sacrosanct ex-
clusive power over intrastate commerce. 197 Henceforth, no area of in-
trastate commerce would be open to the states to regulate which at
the same time is constitutionally closed to Congress; no such area re-
mained fully protected from the threat of congressional intervention.
In this context of a revolutionary extension of federal legislative
competence, the consequence of the preexisting preemption doctrine
(established while there were still significant areas of exclusive state
jurisdiction) would have been to threaten vast areas of state regulation
of seemingly local matters with extinction. Instead, the new constitu-
tional strategy replaced a strict division of powers version of federal-
ism with a new version embodying the presumption that state powers,
though no longer constitutionally guaranteed, survive unless clearly
ended by Congress. Preemption doctrine was thus modified to reflect
this new presumption, and thereafter, Congress was affirmatively re-
quired to manifest an intent to preempt.
Illustrating this shift are two key cases that span the period in
which modem preemption doctrine evolved: Mintz v. Baldwin,198 de-
cided in 1933, and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 199 decided in 1947.
Mintz involved the compatibility of state regulation to prevent infec-
195 See supra part III.C.
196 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE LJ. 453,
510-15 (1989).
197 Under the new interpretation, (a) any effect at all on interstate commerce would
be sufficient to authorize congressional action; (b) congressional assertion of such an ef-
fect would, in almost all cases, be conclusive of its existence; (c) consequently, the distinc-
tion between intra- and inter-state commerce was effectively eliminated.
198 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
199 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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tious cattle diseases with Congress's Cattle Contagious Diseases
Acts.200 The Court, having found no conflict between the two laws, set
forth the circumstances under which state law can nonetheless be
preempted.
Unless limited by the exercise of federal authority under the com-
merce clause, the State has power to make and enforce the order.
The purpose of Congress to supersede or exclude state action
against the ravages of the disease is not lightly to be inferred. The
intention so to do must definitely and clearly appear.
201
Although the Court cites two cases from the founding period of pre-
emption as additional support for this statement, nothing in these or
previous cases gave such a central position to congressional intent in
preemption analysis.
202
Rice constitutes the locus classicus of modem preemption doctrine.
Justice Douglas's statement of the presumption against preemption is
still the one most often quoted in contemporary cases.
Congress legislated here in a field which the States have tradition-
ally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the historic po-
lice powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act [United States Warehouse Act] unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress. Such a purpose may be evidenced in
several ways .... It is often a perplexing question whether Congress
has precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory
measures has left the police power of the States undisturbed except




The task of clarifying the nature of Congress's power to preempt
state lawmaking power by ridding the power of any supposed connec-
tion to the Supremacy Clause, is now complete. This section explores
the implications of the confusion that links preemption with
supremacy, and the impact that correcting this confusion should have
on the content of preemption law.
200 Mintz, 289 U.S. at 347-48.
201 Id. at 350.
202 There are a few earlier references to congressional intent, but none seriously chal-
lenge the notion of automatic preemption. For example, in Reid, Justice Harlan stated, "It
should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or by its legislation suspend the
exercise of the police powers of the States ... unless its purpose to effect that result is
clearly manifested." 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902). As noted in the text, this statement ap-
peared towards the end of the opinion, where Harlan confused preemption and
supremacy. In any event, after the firm establishment of preemption in 1912, there was
little, if any, reference to clearly manifested congressional intent to preempt as a necessary
condition of the exercise of the preemption power.
203 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230-31 (citations omitted).
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As has been discussed above, modern preemption law dates from
two periods: the establishment of a firm power of preemption from
1912 to 1920,204 and the official shift from automatic preemption to
an intent-based test during the 1930s, when the enlargement of the
commerce power would otherwise have threatened to preempt too
much state power.205 Modem preemption law recognizes three ways
in which Congress can preempt the states: first, express preemption,
where Congress expressly states in the text of a statute its intention to
displace state authority in the area; second, field preemption, where
such congressional intent is inferred from the comprehensiveness of
federal regulation, which leaves no room for states to supplement it;
and third, conflict preemption, where there is an actual conflict be-
tween state and federal law.
206
In short, ridding preemption of the ghost of supremacy reveals it
to be nothing more nor less than an instance of ordinary legislative
power, ultimately justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to
which standard principles of statutory interpretation 20 7 should apply
to determine whether the power has in fact been exercised. The doc-
trines of modem preemption law, however, are not derived from, or
justified by, such a conception of preemption; rather, they reflect a
conception of preemption as elevated by an alleged connection to the
Supremacy Clause to form a distinct area of constitutional law. Yet,
neither conflict preemption nor field preemption is justified from the
perspective of ordinary statutory interpretation used to determine
what Congress has actually done. In fact, these two doctrines divert
attention from actual intent.20 8 Both in effect establish a form of "im-
plied-in-law" intent to preempt, which in some instances operates to
"preempt" a fair reading of the statute.
A. "Conflict Preemption"
The doctrine of conflict preemption is expressed in a number of
different ways, reflecting perhaps an underlying uneasiness with its es-
204 See supra notes 158-93 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
206 See supra note 3. Sometimes, but not always, the category of "frustration preemp-
tion" is added as a fourth type of preemption. This is the notion that state law is also
(impliedly) preempted when, even though it does not conflict with a federal statute, it
would unduly frustrate the purposes of that statute to permit concurrent state regulation.
See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
At other times, however, frustration preemption is considered a type of conflict preemp-
tion, involving some lesser degree of conflict between state and federal laws than direct
incompatibility. See, e.g., Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374,
2386 (1992).
207 See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950).
208 Of course, actual intent may be "implied-in-fact."
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sential coherence. The most common formula is the straightforward
one: state law is preempted if it conflicts with federal law.2 09 As dis-
cussed above, however, this statement is a contradiction in terms, rep-
resenting the most basic confusion between preemption and
supremacy.210 The trumping of an otherwise valid state law by
supreme federal law is simply not an instance of preemption, but of
supremacy. Once the inquiry moves from jurisdiction to the content
of a particular piece of legislation, we are in the realm of supremacy.
If, on the other hand, state lawmaking power had truly been pre-
empted, then no state laws would survive to be judged in conflict (or
not in conflict) with federal ones.
As if tacitly acknowledging this fundamental objection, the doc-
trine of conflict preemption is sometimes expressed as follows: state
law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law.21 ' This, however, does nothing to remedy the contradiction, for
the notion of partial preemption (to the extent of conflict) is not an
instance of preemption either, though it may be an extremely loose
way of describing supremacy.
Even if it is conceded that these characterizations of conflict pre-
emption are sloppy and contradictory, a third and more subtle ap-
proach may seem readily available. It is not that the existence of the
actual conflict itself operates to preempt state law (as the previous two
formulations suggest), but rather that such conflicts provide the nec-
essary evidence for implying congressional intent to preempt state law
that conditions the exercise of the power. This refinement is a useful
consequence of the earlier analytical work because, unlike the previ-
ous two accounts of conflict preemption, this one does not suffer from
any internal contradiction. The problem, however, is that taken on its
own terms as a piece of statutory interpretation without the supremacy
baggage, the existence of an actual conflict between state and federal
law should only very rarely provide a sufficient basis for inferring con-
gressional intent to preempt state law.
Consider the possible temporal sequences in which first-order
conflicts arise. Either the relevant congressional statute precedes a
conflicting state statute or it follows one. Where the federal statute
comes first in time without any express preemption provision, how
could one reasonably infer an intent to preempt from the conflict? At
the time the federal statute came into existence, there was no conflict.
Conversely, where the preexisting state regulation is followed by a
conflicting federal statute that neither "occupies the field" nor con-
tains an express preemption provision, surely it is more reasonable to
209 See supra note 10.
210 See supra part I.
211 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204.
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infer that Congress only intended to trump the relevant state statutes
without taking from the state all legislative power in that field. In
short, distinguishing the concepts of preemption and supremacy per-
mits a more nuanced analysis of congressional intent. Given the pre-
sumption against preemption, it is hard to see how actual conflict
clearly manifests congressional intent to preempt rather than the in-
tent to maintain concurrency subject to the Supremacy Clause.
Indeed, in this context the doctrine of conflict preemption not
only fails to give full weight to the express principle of supremacy con-
tained in the Supremacy Clause, but it virtually renders the clause re-
dundant. This is because modem doctrine does not simply equate
supremacy and preemption, but in its application grants priority to the
latter. Only in highly exceptional circumstances does preemption
doctrine permit the Supremacy Clause to operate directly to resolve a
conflict between federal and state law. Under the dominant doctrine,
if Congress intends to preempt state law (either expressly or im-
pliedly, by occupying the relevant field), the principle of supremacy is
not reached because the state law is invalid; i.e., there are not two
valid laws-one state and one federal-in conflict. If, on the other
hand, there is no such congressional intent to preempt, but there is a
conflict between the two laws, the principle of supremacy will still not
apply; instead, the conflict itself is considered evidence of congres-
sional intent to preempt, and once again, because the state law is not
valid, the Supremacy Clause is not reached. Only where there is both
a conflict and express congressional intent not to preempt state law will
supremacy resolve the conflict. Thus, modem preemption doctrine
effectively reads the Supremacy Clause out of the Constitution.
This analysis suggests the elimination of conflict preemption
from preemption law. The doctrine is at best unnecessary and at
worst counterproductive to the real task of interpreting congressional
intent. Once the distinction between supremacy and preemption is
acknowledged, conflict preemption either expresses a contradiction
in terms or it imputes to Congress, effectively as a matter of law, an
intent that is highly questionable in practice. 212
212 Whether "frustration preemption" is understood as a sub-category of conflict pre-
emption or as a distinct type of implied preemption, see supra note 206, what I have stated
in this section about conflict preemption applies equally to it. If it is deemed a sub-cate-
gory of conflict preemption, then the relevant state law is trumped under the Supremacy
Clause, and preemption is not involved. The lesser degree of conflict involved would not
generally provide any greater evidence of congressional intent to preempt.
If, on the other hand, the doctrine refers to a situation in which there is something
less than actual conflict between state law and a subsequent federal statute, it is still not
easy to see how such congressional action presumptively manifests an intent to preempt
state law.
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B. "Field Preemption"
As discussed above, the doctrine of field preemption originated
in the notion that any congressional occupation of a field of regula-
tion automatically preempted state lawmaking capacity in that field.
2 13
Federal movement into a field of regulation from which it had previ-
ously chosen to remain absent triggered preemption. In conse-
quence, any congressional regulation of a field preempted all state
power in that same field. "Occupation of the field" was thus not
merely the paradigmatic instance of preemption, it was in effect the
only one: when Congress occupied the field, neither the issue of in-
tent or conflict would ever be reached. Similarly, the Court justified
automatic field preemption by reference to the Supremacy Clause as
an implication of the "paramount" congressional power over inter-
state commerce, whereas in fact the paramount nature of federal
power under the Supremacy Clause implies only supremacy and not
preemption.2 14
With the radical expansion of the commerce power in the 1930s,
automatic field preemption was perceived as potentially too destruc-
tive of state power. This concern led to modifications reflecting the
general reconstitution of federalism from a principle of constitutional
law to one of congressional policy.215 In this new order, which rests
on the presumption that congressional regulation does not preempt
the states, 216 the doctrine of field preemption seems to have no obvi-
ous application. Rather than discard it altogether, however, modem
preemption doctrine attempted to revise it in line with the new focus
on intent. Although occupation of a field alone does not trigger pre-
emption, it provides evidence of a congressional intent to preempt if
the occupation is pervasive. In other words, the more comprehensive
the field occupation, the more reasonable the inference of
preemption.
The danger of reforming rather than discarding the concept of
field preemption, however, lies in a shift back towards an automatic
element in preemption law that is incompatible with the task of inter-
preting intent. Field preemption provides a shorthand that runs the
risk of detracting from a fair reading of the statute, for the issue be-
comes not whether Congress intended to preempt state law, but
whether the congressional scheme of legislation is comprehensive. If
it is, intent is assumed.
218 See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
214 Id.
215 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.




Clearly, in certain circumstances the scope of federal regulation
does render intent to preempt a reasonable inference, but it is doubt-
ful that intent can always be so inferred. Congress may perfectly plau-
sibly intend or not intend to preempt the states regardless of the
pervasiveness of its scheme of regulation, so that from the perspective
of congressional intent, the doctrine of field preemption is both over-
and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because (a) Congress may in-
tend that states be allowed to supplement federal regulation (that is,
Congress may intend to maintain concurrency plus supremacy), (b)
Congress may not have considered whether or not to preempt, or (c)
Congress may have considered preemption without reaching any con-
clusion. It is under-inclusive because Congress may actually intend to
preempt state law while leaving the particular field relatively, or even
entirely, unregulated by any level of government.
By effectively requiring these other options to be expressly cho-
sen in order to be operative, the doctrine of field preemption is incon-
sistent with modern federalism and its presumption that states retain
concurrent powers.217 As with conflict preemption, the doctrine that
comprehensive regulation automatically provides evidence of congres-
sional intent to preempt ignores alternative interpretations of that in-
tent in a way that potentially distorts the result that would be reached
upon a fair reading of the statute.
In short, ordinary statutory interpretation provides little support
for any analysis suggesting that extensive occupation of a field auto-
matically creates a presumption of intent to preempt. It seems, in-
stead, that the doctrine is artificially imposed on the interpretive
process as a holdover from the period before the radical expansion in
the scope of Congress's interstate commerce power.
CONCLUSION
Preemption is a critical legal concept that helps to define the na-
ture of any federal political system. Once it is known which powers of
the federal and state governments are exclusive and which concur-
rent, it is still necessary to determine whether the concurrent powers
are subject only to the principle of supremacy or also to the power of
preemption in order to understand the true division of powers in that
federal system.
Each entity, local and national, may have exclusive powers over its
areas of jurisdiction. In this case, there is no overlap and the most
formal division of powers exists between the two levels of government.
Obviously, such a federal system does not require a principle of
supremacy, nor does the issue of preemption arise. To the extent,
217 Id.
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however, that state entities have no exclusive powers and the federal
government can preempt their concurrent powers, there is no formal
division of powers between them at all. In this case, the division is a
matter for the ordinary federal legislative process rather than for the
higher law of the constitution; it is contingent or permissive, based on
political or policy concerns of the central authority.
These general observations lead to a critical question about the
nature of the American federal system, and of federalism more gener-
ally. Has the United States, alone among western federal systems,
moved to the permissive end of the spectrum where there is no consti-
tutional protection of state lawmaking capacity?218 If the answer is
affirmative, then it raises the larger question of the essential or theo-
retical difference between a federal and a unitary state.
In the United States, two factors combined to create the current
character of the federal system. First, during the second decade of
this century, it was unambiguously recognized that Congress possesses
the power of preemption. Henceforth, with regard to any subject
matter, if Congress can regulate at all, it can as an instance of such
regulation deprive the states of preexisting concurrent lawmaking ca-
pacity. Second, in the 1930s, the areas of exclusive state power were
drastically contracted with the expansion of Congress's commerce
power.2 1
9
It was the combination of these two factors that was so explosive
and that so dramatically altered the nature of American federalism
from a matter of constitutional law to largely (if not entirely) one of
ordinary law, and not either of these developments alone. For, in the
first place, the situation would be quite different if there were still
significant areas of exclusive state jurisdiction over which the federal
power of preemption could not be used to terminate state power.
The Court's acknowledgment in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit AuthorityP20 that there is no constitutional limitation on the
218 In contrast, Canada comes very close to emulating the first example of the strict
division of powers. The European Union is, in practice, a federation in which the constitu-
ent entities (the "Member States") retain exclusive powers in certain areas, but the central
authority ("the Union") has the power of preempting the Member States in areas of con-
current jurisdiction.
In terms of exclusive Member State power, it is true both that no Community measure
has ever been declared unconstitutional for lack of jurisdiction, and that there is no au-
thoritative enumeration of which powers are exclusively Member State powers. Nonethe-
less, the consensus is that at the present time there are still areas of exclusive state
jurisdiction. In terms of concurrent jurisdiction and-preemption, the constitutional posi-
tion of the Member States has been bolstered by the introduction of the principle of "sub-
sidiarity" into the European Union (Maastricht) Treaty in Article 3b. Henceforth, in areas
of concurrentjurisdiction, the Union shall act only where the particular objectives in ques-
tion cannot be sufficiently achieved at the national level.
219 See supra note 197.
220 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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scope of Congress's power to preempt state law is so significant from
the perspective of federalism only because of the background fact that
virtually all exclusive state powers have been abolished.221 It is the
interplay of exclusive/concurrent powers and supremacy/preemption
that defines the character of the system.
Conversely, the situation would .also be quite different if, despite
the effective extension of federal legislative authority to all areas in
which states can act, it had not also been recognized that this en-
hanced federal authority includes the power to abolish concurrent
state power. The Supremacy Clause does not include this latter
power, it only states that where Congress acts, conflicting state law is
trumped. In other words, the preemption power was a critical in-
dependent factor in the growth of federal power. Unlike supremacy,
preemption is not a necessary feature of a federal system with overlap-
ping jurisdictions.
As should be clear, it is not at all the larger point of this article to
evaluate and render judgment on the merits and demerits of the
changes in the balance between state and federal power that have
taken place during this century; let alone to play the role of advocate
in this debate. Rather. it is to lay the foiindnton. for resolving, the
quite different issue of the meaningfulness of the term "federalism"
when it can continue to be applied to a political and legal system in
which these changes have taken place. If the United States nonethe-
less remains a federal state, in what sense can this be? What then dis-
tinguishes a federal state from a unitary one? With perhaps just a
trace of irony, it may be noted that these two questions are strikingly
analogous to the one that asks in what sense do constitutional rights
221 "[T]he Constitution does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that
Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace." Id. at 550. And also, "[T]he
fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause
to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of result... [, specifically]
the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal gov-
ernmental action." Id. at 554-56 (citations omitted).
In view of the claim that the much-heralded recent case of New York v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), revives federalism as a substantive legal and constitutional principle
(as distinct from merely a political one), it should be noted that the case does not depart at
all from Garcia on the issue of preemption. In New York, the Supreme Court held that in
protecting the sovereignty reserved to the states, the Tenth Amendment prohibits Con-
gress from commandeering "the State's legislative processes by directly compelling them to
enact a federal regulatory program." Id. at 2428. However, the Court made it very clear
that (incidentally, under the Supremacy Clause) "Congress could, if it wished, entirely pre-
empt state radioactive waste regnlation." Id. at 2420. Accordingly, in its own terms, New
York simply constrains the manner in which Congress may limit state sovereignty, it does
not enumerate areas that cannot be limited.
In the light of New York, one is perhaps left wondering why, if it is unconstitutional
coercion for Congress to require a state to pass a specific piece of legislation, it is not also
unconstitutional coercion to forbid them from doing so (that is, preempting state
authority).
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exist in the United Kingdom, where there is no higher law and the
courts lack the power of judicial review. Is the answer in each case
history, tradition, and the integrity of the political process?
